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Passengers rank safety as a key factor in airline choice. Thus, safety performance impacts 
an airline’s ability to attract customers. The purpose of this correlational study was to 
examine the relationship and difference between airline category low-cost carriers 
(LCCs) and full-service carriers (FSCs), geographical region, and safety performance 
measured by accident rates. The target population comprised all airlines in all countries 
that had an accident during the 14-year period 2004 to 2017. Data consisted of archival 
data of all global airline accidents and airline departure frequencies for the 14-year 
period. The theory of organizational accidents in complex sociotechnical systems 
explains the relationship between LCC and FSC safety performance, as well as between 
global geographical regions. The Swiss cheese model of organizational accidents 
theoretical framework remains a relevant model to examine airline accidents and improve 
airline safety. Data analysis consisted of the t test, ANOVA, correlation, and regression 
analysis. LCCs were found to be as safe as FSCs on a global level, and safer than FSCs in 
some regions. There were regional differences in safety, with North America being safer 
than Africa. The implications for positive social change include the potential for airline 
leaders to improve the safety image of their airline and provide passengers a better 
understanding of airline safety. Providing passengers with information on airline safety 
performance allows passengers to make informed choices on using different categories of 
airlines in different geographical regions. The research may result in new travel 
opportunities for travelers that were previously unrealized due to safety concerns, 




Relationship Between Airline Category, Geographical Region, and Safety Performance  
by 
Peter A. Simpson 
 
MA, Australian Catholic University, 2012 
MBA, University of Southern Queensland, 2005 
MSc, Loughborough University, 1999 
BSc(Hon), University of Newcastle, 1995 
 
 
Doctoral Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 









Thanks to God. Thanks to my family for their support and patience. Thanks to Dr. 
Peter Anthony for his guidance and wisdom. Thanks to Dr. Mark Wiggins who seeded 




Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi 
Section 1: Foundation of the Study ......................................................................................1 
Background of the Problem ...........................................................................................1 
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................3 
Purpose Statement ..........................................................................................................3 
Nature of the Study ........................................................................................................4 
Quantitative Research Question and Hypotheses ..........................................................5 
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................5 
Operational Definitions ..................................................................................................6 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations ................................................................7 
Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 7 
Limitations .............................................................................................................. 8 
Delimitations ........................................................................................................... 8 
Significance of the Study ...............................................................................................8 
Contribution to Business Practice ........................................................................... 8 
Implications for Social Change ............................................................................... 9 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature ..............................................10 
The Swiss Cheese Model ...................................................................................... 10 
Low-Cost Carriers ................................................................................................. 27 
Perception of Low-Cost Carrier Safety................................................................. 31 
 
ii 
Regulating Airline Safety ..................................................................................... 35 
Measuring Airline Safety ...................................................................................... 39 
Regional Safety Performance ............................................................................... 48 
Transition .....................................................................................................................57 
Section 2: The Project ........................................................................................................59 
Purpose Statement ........................................................................................................59 
Role of the Researcher .................................................................................................59 
Participants ...................................................................................................................60 
Research Method and Design ......................................................................................61 
Research Method .................................................................................................. 61 
Research Design.................................................................................................... 62 
Population and Sampling .............................................................................................64 
Population ............................................................................................................. 64 
Sampling ............................................................................................................... 64 
Ethical Research...........................................................................................................68 
Data Collection Instruments ........................................................................................68 
Data Collection Technique ..........................................................................................70 
Data Analysis ...............................................................................................................73 
Study Validity ..............................................................................................................76 
Statistical Conclusion Validity ............................................................................. 77 
External Validity ................................................................................................... 80 
Transition and Summary ..............................................................................................81 
 
iii 
Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change ..................82 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................82 
Presentation of the Findings.........................................................................................83 
Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions .................................................................. 84 
Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................. 86 
Inferential Statistical Analysis .............................................................................. 91 
Applications to Professional Practice ..........................................................................97 
Implications for Social Change ....................................................................................99 
Recommendations for Action ....................................................................................100 




Appendix A: Safety Performance by Airline Category and Geographical Region .........140 




List of Tables 
Table 1. Typical Features and Characteristics of LCCs ................................................... 30 
Table 2. Transport Accident Studies Using Accidents to Measure Safety Outcomes ...... 44 
Table 3. Comparison of Regions Between IATA, ICAO, and OAG ................................ 48 
Table 4. IATA Regional Aviation Safety Performance Measured by Aircraft Accident 
Rate ........................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 5. Frequency and Percentage of Accidents for Airline Category and Region ........ 88 
Table 6. Mean and Standard Deviation of Accident Rates for Airline Category and 
Regions ..................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 7. Accident rate of Airline Category across Regions.............................................. 90 
Table 8. Frequency and Percentage of Aircraft Characteristics in Accidents by Airline 
Category .................................................................................................................... 91 
Table 9. ANOVA Summary Table for the Impact of Region on Accident Rate .............. 93 
Table 10. Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables ................................... 94 
Table 11. Accident & Incident Rate of US carriers (Flores & Reyes, 2006) ................... 96 
Table A1. Safety Performance: World ............................................................................ 141 
Table A2. Safety Performance: Western Europe ............................................................ 141 
Table A3. Safety Performance: Eastern Europe and CIS ............................................... 142 
Table A4. Safety Performance: North America .............................................................. 143 
Table A5. Safety Performance: Latin America ............................................................... 145 
Table A6. Safety Performance: North Asia .................................................................... 146 
Table A7. Safety Performance: Asia Pacific .................................................................. 147 
 
v 
Table A8. Safety Performance: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) ....................... 147 




List of Figures 
Figure 1. Model of organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). .......................................... 14 
Figure 2. An early edition of James Reason’s model. ...................................................... 15 
Figure 3. Reason model in the mid-1990s (Reason, 1995). .............................................. 16 
Figure 4. The current version of Swiss cheese model (Li & Thimbleby, 2016) ............... 17 
Figure 5. Human factors analysis classification system (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). 24 
Figure 6. Power as a function of sample size for multiple linear regression. ................... 67 





Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Safety is one of the most important elements of the global aviation industry 
(Kalemba & Campa-Planas, 2017; Kim & Park, 2017), and aviation is the safest form of 
transport (Balcerzak, 2017). Improved safety and security standards have been the 
industry’s key objectives for many reasons. Airlines accidents have immediate, negative, 
and extended global media coverage (Balcerzak, 2017). Airline accidents are very costly 
and have a financial impact on the airline (Walker, Walker, Thiengtham, & 
Pukthuanthong, 2014). Passengers rank safety as a key factor in airline choice (Kim & 
Park, 2017; Lu, 2017; Min & Min, 2015), and accidents have a negative impact on an 
airline’s reputation (Molin, Blange, Cats, & Chorus, 2017). Thus, safety performance 
impacts an airline’s ability to attract customers (Sandada & Matibiri, 2016). Despite the 
fundamental importance of safety to airlines, there is a lack of understanding about the 
safety performance of low-cost carriers (LCCs) and full-service carriers (FSCs) and how 
that may differ around the world. The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was 
to examine the relationship between airline category, geographical region, and safety 
performance. 
Background of the Problem 
Passengers are important stakeholders in the airline business. Airline safety is one 
of the most important factors that passengers consider when selecting an airline for travel 
(Desai, Siddique, & Yaseen, 2014; Jeeradista, Thawesaengskulthaib, & Sangsuwanc, 
2016; Milioti, Karlaftis, & Akkogiounoglou, 2015). Thus, a poor safety image impacts an 
airline’s ability to attract customers (Sandada & Matibiri, 2016). Passengers have a poor 
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understanding of airline safety performance, incorrectly judging airline safety 
performance and making safety judgments based on an airline’s image (Hagmann, 
Semeijn, & Vellenga, 2015; Jeeradista et al., 2016; Milioti et al., 2015; Molin et al., 
2017). The image of LCCs is not as good as the image of FSCs (Molin et al., 2017). The 
public perceives LLCs as being less safe than FSCs, despite the lack of evidence to 
support that perception (Chang & Hung, 2013; Hagmann et al., 2015; Mikulic & 
Prebezac, 2011; Molin et al., 2017; Wahyuni & Fernando, 2016). The lack of 
understanding of airline safety and incorrect judgment of LCC safety may impact 
passenger choice of using LCCs (Lu, 20017), which may have a business impact on 
LCCs (Moon, 2017). 
Aviation authorities do not regulate or control airline service, product quality, or 
airfares, but safety is highly controlled and regulated by global and national regulators 
(Yadav & Nikraz, 2014). All airlines within a country must meet the same minimum 
regulatory standards of safety and security required by that country’s regulator. 
Therefore, service quality, product, and pricing can differ significantly between airlines 
within a country, but safety standards meet the same minimum requirements. The 
problem facing LCCs is the negative perception of LCC safety performance as it impacts 
passenger airline choice, which may ultimately constrain LCC business. Research can 
provide a better understanding of the safety performance of LCCs and FSCs and the way 
in which this may vary across countries or regions. Fleischer, Tchetchik, and Toledo 
(2015) noted that when objective safety information is available, passengers will discount 
their subjective opinions and perceptions and incorporate that objective information into 
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their decision making. I have presented the background to the problem, and the focus will 
now shift to the problem statement. 
Problem Statement 
Poor safety performance in the airline industry impacts airline economic 
performance (Walker et al., 2014). Airline accidents can result in direct costs of over 
US$500 million per accident (Walker et al., 2014). The general business problem was 
that airline safety performance impacts airline reputation and sustainability. The specific 
business problem was that some airline managers do not understand the relationship 
between airline category, geographical region, and safety performance. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the relationship 
between airline category, geographical region, and safety performance. The independent 
variables were the category of an airline classified as an LCC or FSC and the geographic 
region classified as the global region in which the airline is based. The dependent 
variable was the safety performance measured by aircraft accidents. The target population 
comprised archival data records of global passenger airlines. The implications for 
positive social change include the potential for airline leaders to improve the safety image 
of their airline and provide passengers a better understanding of airline safety. Providing 
passengers with information on airline safety performance is beneficial for nervous flyers 
(Graham & Metz, 2017) and may allow passengers to make more informed choices on 
using different categories of airlines in different geographical regions. The research may 
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result in new travel opportunities for travelers that were previously unrealized due to 
safety concerns. 
Nature of the Study 
I chose a quantitative methodology for this study. Airline accident rates are the 
most common measure of safety performance (Neves, 2015; Oster, Strong, & Zorn, 
2013), and the use of accident numbers and rates lends itself to quantitative analysis. 
Quantitative researchers identify changes in numerical characteristics of the population 
being studied and examine statistical relationships between the variables (Paul & Garg, 
2014), which was the purpose of this study. Qualitative methods are appropriate when the 
intent is to explore a business process or how people make sense and meaning of their 
experiences (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). A mixed methods study contains the 
attributes of both quantitative and qualitative methods (Guetterman, Fetters, & Creswell, 
2015). Because the intent of my study was quantitative, the qualitative and mixed-method 
approaches were not appropriate.  
Correlation is the statistical measure of how closely and in what direction two 
variables are related (Emerson, 2015). Differences in independent group means are 
measured with the t test and ANOVA (Sullivan, Weinberg, & Keaney, 2016). The 
correlation design, t tests, and ANOVAs were appropriate for this study because a key 
objective was to explore differences between and predict the relationship between the 
nominal independent variables of airline category categorized as LCC or FSC and airline 
geographical location, and a ratio dependent variable of airline safety performance 
measured by accident rate. Other designs, such as experimental and quasi-experimental 
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designs are appropriate for assessing cause and effect (Froman & Owen, 2014). The 
objective of this study was to examine the relationship between variables, not to assess 
cause and effect. Thus, the experimental and quasi-experimental designs were not 
appropriate. 
Quantitative Research Question and Hypotheses 
RQ: What is the relationship between airline category, geographical region, and 
safety performance?  
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between airline category, 
geographical region, and safety performance.  
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between airline category, 
geographical region, and safety performance.  
Theoretical Framework 
Reason’s (1995, 1997, 1998) systems approach to organizational accidents, 
visualized as the Swiss cheese model, is the most widely-used theory of accident 
causation throughout various industries, including aviation (Underwood & Waterson, 
2014). Reason’s theory is that active failures are unsafe acts (errors and violations) by 
front-end operators. In contrast, latent failures are weaknesses or gaps in system safety 
defenses created by distant stakeholders, such as designers, builders, regulators, or top-
level managers. High technology systems have multiple defenses in layers. The layers of 
defense in the system are like pieces of Swiss cheese as they have weaknesses or holes. 
The holes are dynamic, changing in size and location. Holes in a single slice or defense 
does not normally cause a bad outcome, but when all the holes momentarily align is when 
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a failure has a clear path through the system, resulting in a catastrophic accident (Reason, 
1995, 1997, 1998) 
The aviation safety regulator and its regulations are an organizational factor and 
defense in the Swiss cheese model. All airlines within a country must meet the same 
minimum regulatory standards of safety and security set by the national regulator (Yadav 
& Nikraz, 2014). Thus, within a country, both LCCs and FSCs should have similar levels 
of safety performance. National aviation regulators have varying levels of sophistication 
to implement, assure, and enforce safety regulations and programs, resulting in different 
safety performance between countries and regions (Faure, 2014; Oster et al., 2013).  
Operational Definitions 
Accident: An event where all the following criteria are satisfied (International Air 
Transport Association [IATA], 2017): 
• Persons have boarded the aircraft with the intention of flight (flight crew or 
passengers). 
• The intention of the flight is limited to normal commercial aviation activities, 
specifically scheduled/charter passenger or cargo service. Executive jet 
operations, training, maintenance/test flights are all excluded. 
• The aircraft is turbine powered and has a certificated maximum take-off 
weight of at least 5,700KG. 
• The aircraft has sustained major structural damage which adversely affects the 
structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and 
would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected 
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component, exceeding US$1million or 10% of the aircraft’s hull reserve 
value, whichever is lower, or the aircraft has been declared a hull loss. 
Full-service carrier (FSC): A traditional national or major carrier that operates on 
a relatively extensive route network (thus, also referred to as a network carrier) and 
provides a full range of in-flight services, ground services, and frequent flyer programs 
(International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], 2004) 
Low-cost carrier (LCC): A carrier that focuses on providing low-cost air transport 
services to customers with simple or limited in-flight services (ICAO, 2004). I 
categorized airlines as LCC based on ICAO’s (2017) list of LCCs.  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are elements of the research study taken for granted or accepted as 
true without concrete proof (Kirkwood & Price, 2013). The first assumption in this study 
was that accidents are a valid and reliable measure of airline safety performance. 
Accidents are commonly used to measure aviation safety performance (Boyd, 2016, 
2015; Knecht, 2013; Elvik & Elvebakk, 2016). The second assumption was that the OAG 
Aviation Worldwide Ltd. (OAG) accurately and consistently recorded flight frequency 
for all global regions. The final assumption is that IATA captured all airline accidents 
each year that met their definition of an accident. To ensure that IATA captured all airline 





Limitations are potential weaknesses or problems with the study that cannot be 
controlled by the researcher. Stating the limitations allows other researchers to replicate 
or expand on the study (Simon, 2011). The main limitation of the study was the use of 
archived data and records from the IATA, ICAO, and OAG. Any inaccuracy in the data 
reported by these organizations could negatively affect the accuracy of the study. My 
accident data set was limited to the period from 2004 to 2017. I measured safety 
performance by accidents, which are retrospective and limited in number. A lack of flight 
sector data for all airlines in the accident database does not permit the calculation of 
accident rates for individual airlines.  
Delimitations 
Delimitations set the scope or boundary of the study, stating what constructs and 
factors the researcher leaves out of the study (Simon, 2011). I only used airline accidents 
reported by IATA in their Annual Safety Report in the study to ensure geographical and 
historical consistency. The accident data is limited to the 14-year period 2004 to 2017. 
Significance of the Study 
Contribution to Business Practice 
Passengers rank airline safety as one of the most important factors in airline 
choice selection (Desai et al., 2014; Jeeradista et al., 2016; Jiang, 2013; Min & Min, 
2015). Thus, safety performance impacts an airline’s ability to attract customers (Sandada 
& Matibiri, 2016). The research may be of value to airline leaders as the findings from 
the study will determine if there is a significant relationship between airline category 
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(LCC or FSC), geographical region, and safety performance. Establishing a relationship 
between the variables may allow predictions of safety performance. Passengers are often 
willing to pay more to fly with airlines they perceive as safe (Molin et al., 2017), and 
passengers are more loyal to safe airlines, avoiding unsafe airlines, particularly in regions 
with historically poor airline safety performance (Sandada & Matibiri, 2016).  
Passengers have previously chosen to fly FSCs over LCCs due to the better safety 
image of FSCs (Lu, 2017). Information related to airline safety performance might be 
used by airline managers to shape airline image and influence passenger airline choice, 
which may impact business performance. Fleischer et al. (2015) noted that when 
objective safety information is available, passengers will discount their subjective 
opinions and perceptions and incorporate that objective information into their decision 
making on airline choice, and that includes paying a premium to travel on airlines with 
high safety performance. In summary, there is a potential business benefit through 
increased knowledge of airline safety performance. 
Implications for Social Change 
The implications for positive social change include the potential to provide 
passengers a better understanding of airline safety performance, presenting greater 
opportunities for passengers to make informed choices about airline selection. Improving 
travelers’ awareness of safety is important, as safety is one of the most important 
considerations in airline choice. Information that can reduce the safety concerns of 
nervous flyers is of benefit to those travelers (Graham & Metz, 2017). The inclination to 
avoid an airline perceived as having poor safety performance is stronger in individuals 
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with a high fear of flying. Fleischer et al. (2015) noted that up to 30% of the adult 
population has a fear of flying and providing airline safety information to that population 
allows a more rational airline choice. Removing any barriers to air travel, especially those 
around safety, may result in new travel opportunities for travelers that were previously 
unrealized due to their safety concerns. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The purpose of this quantitative correlation study was to examine the relationship 
between airline category, geographical region, and safety performance. The independent 
variables were the category of an airline classified as an LCC or FSC, and the geographic 
region classified as the global region of base operations of the airline. The dependent 
variable was the safety performance measured by aircraft accidents. Reason’s Swiss 
cheese model (Reason, 1997) was the theoretical framework for the study.  
I searched EBSCO host (all databases), ProQuest, Thoreau multidatabase, and 
Google Scholar for relevant articles in the topic areas of transport safety and regulation, 
airline safety, regional safety, low-cost carriers, system and organizational safety, and 
the Swiss cheese model. I obtained professional literature, databases, and material from 
aviation regulatory bodies (ICAO, US FAA, UK, CAA, and IATA). The review of the 
literature included 126 references. Eighty-eight percent of the references were within five 
years of expected completion of the study, and 85% were peer-reviewed.  
The Swiss Cheese Model 
Organizational accident theory. The organizational approach, also called the 
systems approach, is the dominant paradigm in operational safety and accident analysis 
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of complex and dynamic sociotechnical systems (Underwood & Waterson, 2013). 
Accidents in complex sociotechnical systems are the result of unexpected, dynamic, 
uncontrolled, and often complex relationships and interactions between the system’s 
components. In complex sociotechnical systems, such as aviation, nuclear, and 
petrochemical industries, the frequency of accidents is low, but the consequence is 
catastrophic (Li, Zhang, & Liang, 2017). Underwood and Waterson (2013) advocated 
studying systems as whole entities rather than considering the components in isolation 
due to the involvement and interaction of the system’s components. Indeed, the system 
life cycle phases of design, development, construction, operation, and maintenance and 
modification are all phases when latent weakness may be introduced (Stoop, de Kroes, & 
Hale, 2017). This situation highlights the interactions and tight coupling between all 
elements and even phases of complex sociotechnical systems. The Swiss cheese model is 
the central model of the systems approach to accidents in sociotechnical systems (Le 
Coze, 2013). 
Swiss cheese model. Reason’s (1995, 1997, 1998, 2000b) systems approach to 
organizational accidents, visualized as the Swiss cheese model, is the most widely-used 
theory of accident causation throughout various industries (Underwood & Waterson, 
2014). Larouzee and Guarnieri (2015) described the Swiss cheese model as having 
established itself as the reference model in the causation, investigation, and 
understanding, and prevention of organization accidents. In many industries, the Swiss 
cheese model has been the vector of a new paradigm of safety science, namely the 
organizational accident (Le Coze, 2013). Indeed, the Swiss cheese model has become the 
12 
 
global model of aviation accident causation and prevention used by the ICAO. Google 
scholar has over 25,000 citations of Reason’s Swiss cheese model (Larouzee & 
Guarnieri, 2015). These statements provide insight into the importance of Reason’s 
theory of organizational accidents and the Swiss cheese model to the safety field. The 
Swiss cheese model has been applied to multiple industries including aviation (Gerstle, 
2018), medical and healthcare (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014; Gerstle, 
2018; Stein & Heiss, 2015), nursing (Correia, Martins, & Forte, 2017; de Lima Gomes et 
al., 2016), mining (Bonsu, Franzidis, Isafiade, van Dyk, & Petersen, 2017), nuclear 
(Reason, 1995), chemical processing (Soignier, Summers, & Williams, 2014), oil and gas 
(Chen et al., 2017), and rail (Matsika, Ricci, Mortimer, Georgiev, & O’Neill, 2013; 
Underwood & Waterson, 2014).  
Humans cannot eliminate error; human error is inevitable (Reason, 1995). Thus, 
systems must be error-tolerant to prevent errors leading to accidents. In these situations, 
human error is a consequence rather than a cause, and blaming operators for errors and 
subsequent accidents does not improve safety. The traditional model of safety and 
accident causation that focused on active failures (human errors and mistakes) and single 
causes is inadequate (Aini & Fakhru’l-Razi, 2013; Xia, Liu, Wang, Zhu, & Zou, 2018). 
The person-centered approach does not address contextual or task-related factors, nor any 
supervisory, managerial, or organizational factors. The person-centered approach does 
not improve on poor design or procedures, nor does it strengthen defenses or address all 
hazards and risks. Aini and Fakhru’l-Razi (2013) suggested the medical industry’s 
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continual adherence to the person-centered approach to safety continues to hinder safety 
progress and result in no significant reduction in patient deaths from medical errors. 
Reason (1995) explored broader conditions that led to, exacerbated, or did not 
prevent human error from resulting in disaster. The fundamental principle of Reason’s 
theory of organizational accidents is that organizational accidents are the catastrophic 
events that occur in complex sociotechnical systems involving many different people at 
different levels (Reason, 1997). The systems approach to organizational accidents 
explores the multiple latent and systemic factors that interact to contribute to accidents.  
In the Swiss cheese model, active failures (errors, mistakes, and violations) are 
unsafe acts by front-end operators. In contrast, latent failures are weaknesses or gaps in 
system safety defenses created by distant stakeholders, such as designers, builders, 
regulators, or top-level managers. Complex sociotechnical systems have multiple 
defenses in layers or barriers. The layers of defense in the system have holes and 
weaknesses, like pieces of Swiss cheese. The holes are dynamic and change in size and 
location. Holes or weakness in a single slice or defense do not normally result in a 
catastrophic outcome, but when all the holes momentarily align, any failure has a clear 
path through the system, with the potential to result in a catastrophic accident (Reason, 
1995, 1997, 1998, 2000b). Thus, in a complex system, accidents only occur when all the 
defenses fail, reinforcing the convergence of events and conditions (Chen et al., 2017). 




Figure 1. Model of organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). 
The development of the Swiss cheese model. The Swiss cheese model had its 
origins in 1987 when Reason was writing his seminal book, Human Error (Reason, 
1990a), in which Reason explored the nature, variety, and cognitive sources of human 
error. Through accident analysis, Reason (1990a) distinguished between active errors and 
latent errors. The performance of operators at the sharp end (active errors, mistakes, and 
violations) is influenced by local workplace conditions and upstream organizational 
factors (latent errors). Reason compared the latent errors to resident pathogens in the 
body, lying dormant until they combined with other factors to breach system defenses 
and result in an accident. Perrow’s (1984) normal accident theory had previously 
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described the concept of organizational issues influencing operator action, and the normal 
accident theory also contained the concept of defenses-in-depth creating system opacity, 
complexity, and interdependencies. The concept of accident pathogens is still in 
contemporary accident theory. For example, Gnoni and Saleh (2017) noted that accident 
pathogens are adverse latent or preexisting conditions, passive or with no impact on the 
system until triggered by other adverse events. 
 
Figure 2. An early edition of James Reason’s model. 
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Reason’s original model, shown in Figure 2, was simple and focused on human 
error, consisting of psychological precursors and unsafe acts that both had weakness and 
holes, as well as multiple defenses-in-depth which had holes to allow the trajectory of 
accident opportunity to breach the defenses (Reason, 1990a). Shortly after, Reason 
reengineered and refocused the model towards a more organizational approach, with five 
planes consisting of elements that make up complex sociotechnical systems: top-level 
decision makers, line managers, preconditions, production activities, and defenses 
(Reason, 1990b). Reason later expanded these elements and renamed them organizational 
elements (management decisions, procedures, and culture), task/environment (conditions 
that produce errors and violations), and operator/individual (persons who make errors and 
violations), as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Reason model in the mid-1990s (Reason, 1995). 
In the mid-1990s latent errors were renamed latent failures, which later became 
latent conditions (Reason, 1997), acknowledging the fact that effective decisions at one 
point in time may have unintended negative outcomes at another time and place in the 
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system (Larouzee & Guarnieri, 2015). The decisions may not have been wrong at the 
time they were made, and accident investigators should not consider the decisions as 
errors or failures. The Swiss cheese model appeared in the late-1990s with the 
transformation of the defensive barriers and elements in the system from simple layers 
with weaknesses and holes to slices of Swiss cheese (see Figure 4; Reason, 1998). The 
model then moved from the academic world into the mainstream, practitioner 
environment of accident investigation and operational safety management. Reason (1995) 
applied the model to case studies of the Dryden air crash and a nuclear accident, 
demonstrating its validity and use across various industries. 
 
Figure 4. The current version of Swiss cheese model (Li & Thimbleby, 2016) 
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Larouzee and Guarnieri (2015) cataloged the history and development of 
Reason’s Swiss cheese model from its first publication in 1990 to its current form 
published in 2000. In doing so, Larouzee and Guarnieri inadvertently highlighted a 
weakness of the model, that Reason has not updated the Swiss cheese model since 2000. 
Thus, the model has become stagnant.  
The Swiss cheese model in detail. The components of Reason’s model are 
organizational elements, workplace or environmental elements, and person/team 
elements. The components have weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and failures represented by 
holes. All systems have defenses which are either effective, failed or ineffective, or 
absent. Failure pathways are active failures or latent conditions. The following sections 
described these components in more detail. 
Active failures. Reason (2000b) noted that active failures are unsafe acts, 
categorized as errors, mistakes, lapses, and violations. Front-end operators or those in 
direct contact with the system, introduce active failures. Active failures create 
weaknesses in the defenses or protective layers. Active failures usually have a direct and 
short-lived impact on the integrity of the system defenses (Reason, 2000b). While many 
legal approaches to accidents seek an individual to blame for the proximal unsafe acts, 
Reason (2000b) noted that almost all such acts have a causal history that extends back in 
time or up through the levels of the system. 
Latent Conditions. Latent conditions are present in the system before the operator 
interacts with it. Latent conditions are gaps, weaknesses, or absence in or of defenses 
unwittingly created by distant stakeholders, such as designers, builders, regulators, or 
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top-level managers. Latent conditions can lay dormant for many years before interacting 
with active failures and local conditions to create the opportunity for an accident. For 
example, the design flaws of the Concorde fuel tank lay dormant for 40 years until 
exposed in the 2000 Air France crash of the Concorde (Moyer, 2014). Latent conditions 
are removed in proximity to an accident. For example, both Aini and Fakhru’l-Razi 
(2013) and Waring (2015) highlighted the importance of regulators in organizational 
accidents, despite regulators being removed in both time and space from the accident. 
Reason reinforced that latent conditions are present in every complex system, as 
no system is perfect. The positive aspect of latent conditions is the potential to identify 
and resolve the issues before they cause harm. Reason (2000b) provided an analogy of 
active and latent failures: active failures are like mosquitos which can be swatted one-by-
one, but they keep coming. The best remedy is to create more effective defenses and to 
drain the swamps in which the mosquitos breed. In this case, the swamps are the latent 
conditions. 
Defenses. Defenses, barriers, or safeguards protect people and assets from local 
hazards. Local hazards can include human error and violations. High technology systems 
often have multiple defenses in layers, known as defenses-in-depth, which Gnoni and 
Saleh (2017) noted as a fundamental safety principle. The layers of defense should be 
diverse. Some system defenses are engineered (e.g., alarms, physical barriers, and 
automatic shutdowns), some defenses rely on people (e.g., pilots, ATC, surgeons, and 
control room operators), other defenses rely on procedures and administrative controls 
(e.g., checklists, rules, and procedures), and some rely on organizational structures (e.g., 
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regulators, and oversight). The multiple defenses in the Swiss cheese model that gives the 
model its name. The layers of defense have weaknesses or holes like pieces of Swiss 
cheese. The holes are dynamic, opening and closing, growing, and shrinking, and shifting 
location. Having holes in a single slice or defense does not normally cause a bad outcome 
but, an error trajectory has a clear path through the system when all the holes 
momentarily align, resulting in a catastrophic accident. The holes due to active failures 
are likely to be dynamic and short-lived, while the holes arising from latent conditions 
are less dynamic and long-term, lying dormant for many years (Reason, 1998). 
One of the defensive layers in the aviation system is the regulatory layer. In a 
study of sociotechnical disasters, Aini and Fakhru’l-Razi (2013) found that organizational 
and regulatory failures were the main contributing factors to the disasters. Such 
regulatory failures may be due to inadequate or outdated laws and regulations, poor 
regulatory reinforcement, and inadequate or incompetent personnel, all of which fail to 
effectively govern and monitor safety (Aini & Fakhru’l-Razi, 2013). Regulatory systems 
are country-specific, and regulators have varying degrees of competence, resource, and 
effectiveness. Thus, the strength of the regulatory defense varies between countries. All 
the airlines within a country are subject to the same strength (or weakness) of regulatory 
defenses. The varying strength of the regulatory layer forms the basis for the assertion 
that airlines within a country will all have similar levels of safety, but safety will differ 
between countries or regions.  
Comparing the Swiss cheese model to other models. Researchers have 
compared and tested the Swiss cheese model with and against other models of 
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organizational safety (Le Coze, 2013; Underwood & Waterson, 2013). A model can 
never fully capture complex operational reality and models will always remain limited 
and inadequate. No model is without limitations, and the limitations also relate to the 
application context, and the background and knowledge of the user (Le Coze, 2013).  
Le Coze (2013) produced a comprehensive analysis of the Swiss cheese model 
and two of its contemporary models of system safety, Rasmussen’s migration model and 
Weick’s collective mindfulness model. Le Coze based his analysis of the three models on 
eight attributes of the models, and general commentary on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the models. A weakness identified in the Swiss cheese model was the lack of detail 
and explanation about the nature of the holes, precisely what the holes represent and how 
they occur. The Swiss cheese model was more popular with practitioners, while 
Rasmussen’s and Weick’s models were more aligned with academia and rarely used by 
accident investigators (Le Coze, 2013).  
Underwood and Waterson (2014) applied three models of organizational safety 
(Swiss cheese model, AcciMap, and STAMP) to the Grayrigg train derailment. The 
application all three models to one common accident allowed for the identification and 
comparison of the strength and weakness of each model. The Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau (ATSB) used the Swiss cheese model for accident investigation and reporting, 
while research and academic applications of accident analysis often use the AcciMap and 
STAMP models (Underwood & Waterson, 2014).  
Underwood and Waterson (2013) noted that the Swiss cheese model is the most 
popular and widely used systems approach model. Although, various authors (e.g., Le 
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Coze, 2013; Li & Thimbleby, 2014; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), have criticized the 
Swiss cheese model for its sequential nature and oversimplification of accident causation. 
There has also been criticism over the Swiss cheese model’s lack of description of how 
the holes line up, and the idea that some investigators take an overly-prescriptive 
application of the model. Underwood and Waterson balanced those criticisms by noting 
Reason’s commentary on the use of the Swiss cheese model, which negates many of 
these criticisms, including statements that the linear serialization is simply a static 
representation, whereas Reason’s theory of organizational accidents is neither linear nor 
static. The criticisms of the Swiss cheese model appear to arise from an overly-simplistic 
and inadequate understanding of the model and the detailed theory underpinning it, rather 
than a faulty model. Like Le Coze (2013), Underwood and Waterson (2014) concluded 
that the Swiss cheese model was better suited to investigation practitioners, whereas the 
AcciMap and STAMP models may be better suited to academic research scenarios. 
Underwood and Waterson also concluded that despite the criticisms, the Swiss cheese 
model remains a viable and important model for understanding complex organizational 
accidents.  
Adaptations of the Swiss cheese model. There have been numerous adaptations 
and extensions of Reason’s theory of organizational accidents. Arguably, the most 
successful adaptation has been Shappell and Weigmann’s human factors analysis 
classification system (HFACS) (Cohen, Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2015; Ergai et al., 2016; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). HFACS has become a standard tool for examining and 
understanding the contribution of human factors to accidents across a range of industries. 
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Shappell and Wiegmann operationalized the concepts of the Swiss cheese model to 
develop a framework for classifying and analyzing the human factors associated with 
accidents. HFACS uses the same levels presented by Reason in his model; organizational 
influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts (see Figure 
5), which describe the holes of the Swiss cheese model at four levels (Fu, Cao, Zhou, & 
Xiang, 2017). Within each level of HFACS, causal categories identify the active and 
latent failures. Thus, the HFACS model continues the theory of preventing organizational 
accidents by identifying organizational and systemic weakness rather than focusing on 
and blaming the individual operators (Theophilus et al., 2017).  
Wiegmann and Shappell (2001) criticized the Swiss cheese model as being 
insufficiently specific regarding the nature of the holes in the cheese and their inter-
relationships, a criticism made by others as well (Le Coze, 2013). Thus, the HFACS 
defined what the holes are, with a focus on human factors. For example, supervisory 
factors are broken into subcategories of inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, failure to correct known problems, and supervisory violation (Cohen et al., 
2015). The HFACS has been applied to various domains, including aviation (Daramola, 
2014), marine and shipping (Akyuz, 2017; Akyuz, Celik, & Cebi, 2016; Chen et al., 
2013; Soner, Asan, & Celik, 2015), construction (Xia et al., 2018), rail (Zhan, Zheng, & 
Zhao, 2017), oil and gas (Theophilus et al., 2017), mining (Fu et al., 2017), and 





Figure 5. Human factors analysis classification system (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).   
Developments and Updates of the Swiss cheese model. Some of the criticism of 
the Swiss cheese model may be due to its inappropriate use. For example, Collins et al. 
(2014) used the Swiss cheese model to examine the effectiveness of medical checklists to 
reduce active errors. Active errors are just one part of the Swiss cheese model, and the 
study reinforced that errors are the final active failure. However, the Swiss cheese model 
emphasizes the latent organizational issues impacting the active failures, highlighting the 




A criticism of the Swiss cheese model is that it has remained relatively static since 
its development in the 1990s. Le Coze (2013) questioned whether models such as Swiss 
cheese model have expired or are still valid. One argument is that safety-critical 
industries should consider and implement more insights from existing models rather than 
develop new models (Le Coze, 2013). While there have been advances in technology and 
automation, humans have not changed, nor have their interactions with technology. 
Organizations and regulators have not changed, nor have safety cultures, or our general 
understanding of organizational accidents. Le Coze also argued that no model is ever 
entirely satisfactory, as models cannot fully capture complex realities and all experienced 
phenomena. Models will always have limitations, and those limitations extend to the 
background, skills, and knowledge of the user, as well as the context in which the model 
is being used (Le Coze, 2013). Indeed, the Swiss cheese model is a relatively simple and 
intuitive model on the surface, but the complex theories of organizational accidents, 
human factors, and human error underpin the model. 
While Reason has not updated the Swiss cheese model since 2000, other authors 
have developed and updated the Swiss cheese model. Li and Thimbleby (2014) 
developed the hot cheese model after criticizing the Swiss cheese model for being overly 
simplistic and static, not realistically portraying the dynamic situations and interactions 
between the layers, and not categorizing unsafe acts as errors, violations, or reckless 
behaviors. However, Li and Thimbleby’s hot cheese model is complex and unintuitive, 
with eight different ‘types’ of cheese layers, requiring a reference key to understand what 
the eight types of cheese mean. The hot cheese model does not categorize operators’ 
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unsafe acts, despite Li and Thimbleby’s criticism of that weakness in the Swiss cheese 
model. The authors have a fondue pot at the bottom of the model to catch drips of melted 
cheese which represent corporate knowledge and lessons learned, taking the cheese 
metaphor to an absurd level. Li and Thimbleby’s statement that the Swiss cheese model 
is too simple and static, suggesting that they do not understand the theoretical foundations 
of the Swiss cheese model. Indeed, Reason had dedicated several books to explain the 
theory of organizational accidents (Reason, 1990a, 1997) and has stated that the elements 
of the Swiss cheese model, including the holes, are dynamic and changing (Reason, 
1997). The success of the Swiss cheese model, particularly amongst practitioners has 
been its portrayal of a complex theory in an intuitive model (Underwood & Waterson, 
2013). Furthermore, Reason’s (1997) theory of organizational safety and human error 
contains a culpability decision tree that categorizes unsafe acts as errors, mistakes, 
violations, or reckless behaviors, further highlighting gaps in Li and Thimbleby’s 
knowledge and understanding of the Swiss cheese model and its theoretical 
underpinnings. The hot cheese model has not successfully superseded the Swiss cheese 
model, nor have other authors have referenced it. 
Hudson (2014) reviewed two methods for reducing the risks of accidents. Hudson 
first applied a legal model to identify the single cause of an accident and then applied the 
Swiss cheese model to look for more systematic, complex, latent causes. Hudson stated 
that 80% of accidents are preventable by using the legal model approach, and then a 
further 80% of remaining accidents reduced with the Swiss cheese model, leaving just 
4% of accidents unpreventable by the two approaches. However, Hudson provided no 
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evidence or data for his suggestion of an 80% reduction in accidents. The first model 
applied by Hudson was a purely legal model, and the problem with legal models is that 
what is legal is not necessarily safe, and what is illegal is not always unsafe. Legal 
models must find and allocate liability and blame, usually implicating the operators. 
Organizational accident theory and the Swiss cheese model operate on the concept that 
single active failures do not result in catastrophic accidents in complex sociotechnical 
systems. Thus, laying blame on a single person for a complex sociotechnical accident is 
inappropriate and unhelpful. Therefore, the concepts and models used by Hudson conflict 
and are incompatible with each other. 
Meshkati and Placencia developed the double-shielded, fortified Swiss cheese 
model (Meshkati, 2014). The model added the safety regulator as a top-down influence 
on safety performance, and an organization’s safety culture as a bottom-up influence on 
safety performance. The model depicted strong and independent regulatory oversight, and 
rigorous and proactive safety inspection, enforcement, and verification by the regulator to 
influence and impact system safety from the top-down (Meshkati, 2014). However, 
Reason (1995, 1998) described and depicted both the safety regulator and safety culture 
as part of the Swiss cheese model in the organization section. Thus, it is unclear what 
additional value Meshkati’s double-shielded, fortified Swiss cheese model brings. 
Low-Cost Carriers 
The definition of an LCC. LCCs are also known as no-frills, low-fare, discount, 
or budget airlines. However, LCC is the name officially used by the IATA (2006), the 
ICAO (2004, 2017), and the U.S. Department of Transport (U.S. DOT) (1996). LCC is 
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also the term commonly used in the academic literature (Bowen Jr, 2016; Buaphiban & 
Truong, 2017; Fageda, Suau-Sanchez, & Mason, 2016; Kwoka, Hearle, & Alepin, 2016; 
Lordon, 2014; Yu, Chang, & Chen, 2016). The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) used 
the term no-frills carrier instead of LCC to avoid confusion with charter airlines which 
have also considered themselves to be low-cost (CAA, 2006). The UK CAA stated that it 
is the comparative lack of frills on-board, coupled with low airfares, which are defining 
characteristics of a no-frills airline for the public and media. 
The ICAO is inconsistent with its definitions of LCCs. In the Manual on the 
Regulation of International Air Transport, the ICAO (2004) defined an LCC as a carrier 
that has a relatively low-cost structure in comparison with other comparable carriers and 
offers’ low fares. In the same Manual, the ICAO defined a no-frills carrier as a carrier 
that focuses on providing low-cost air transport services to customers with simple or 
limited in-flight services. The ICAO also defined an FSC as a carrier, typically a 
traditional national or major carrier that operates on a relatively extensive route network 
(thus, also referred to as a network carrier) and provides a full range of in-flight services, 
ground services, and frequent flyer programs. Despite the ICAO’s definitions, ICAO does 
not refer to the term low-frills carrier in other documents, press releases, or events. 
Instead, the ICAO use the term LCC in the way they define no-frills carriers (ICAO, 
2017). The ICAO published and updated a list of 265 LCCs, including those no longer 
operating (ICAO, 2017). In this research study, I used the ICAO (2017) list of LCCs to 
categorize airlines as LCCs. 
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Academic literature that examines airlines as LCCs and FSCs aligns with the 
ICAO list (e.g., Bowen Jnr, 2016; Fageda et al., 2016; Hanaoka, Takebayashi, Ishikura, 
& Sarawati, 2014; Klein, Albers, Allroggen, & Malina, 2015; Kwoka et al., 2016; 
Lordon, 2014; Yu et al., 2016). The UK CAA (2006) produced a list of LCCs operating 
within and into Europe, which aligns with the ICAO’s LCC list.  
The characteristics of an LCC. There is no universally agreed definition or 
standard business model of an LCC (CAA, 2006; Fageda et al., 2016; IATA, 2006). The 
U.S. DOT (1996) categorized LCCs by unit costs (cost per available seat kilometers 
[ASK]) and airfare pricing practices. Although, the U.S. DOT contradicted their 
definition by categorizing some carriers as LCCs, such as Vanguard and Western Pacific, 
despite having higher unit costs than some legacy or network carriers (U.S. DOT, 1996). 
The UK CAA (2006) stated that judging whether an airline has high or low costs is more 
complicated than assessing its onboard services and the judgment is less relevant. Some 
FSCs have low operating costs, and some LCCs have high operating costs (Kwoka et al., 
2016). Thus, operating cost is a poor differentiator between an LCC and an FSC. ICAO 
supported the UK CAA’s statements by noting that FSCs are shifting their focus to cost 
reduction for a sustainable business model. 
Despite the lack of agreed definition of an LCC, there is a general understanding 
in the industry, regulatory bodies, the media, and the public of what LCCs are, based on 
their operating model and consumer offering (CAA, 2006). IATA (2006) stated typical 
features and characteristics of LCCs, listed in Table 1. The academic literature supports 
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the IATA list of LCC characteristics and features (Buaphiban & Truong, 2017; Fageda et 
al., 2016; Kwoka et al., 2016). 
Table 1 
 
Typical Features and Characteristics of LCCs 
 
Point-to-point operations. 
Serving short-haul routes, often to/from regional or secondary airports. 
A strong focus on price-sensitive traffic, mostly leisure passengers. 
One service class, with no customer loyalty programs. 
Limited passenger services, with additional charges for some services such as food, 
beverages, baggage, seat selection, and amenities. 
Low average fares, with a strong focus on price competition. 
Airfare pricing related to aircraft load factors and length of time before departure. 
A high proportion of bookings made through the Internet. 
High aircraft utilization rates, with short turnaround times between flight. 
A fleet consisting of just one or two types of aircraft. 
Private-sector companies. 
Simple management and overhead structure with a lean decision-making process. 
Note. From IATA (2006). 
LCC and FSC convergence. The distinction between LCC and FSC is becoming 
blurred. LCCs are now offering services such as networking and alliance partners (e.g., 
JetBlue, Air Berlin), long-haul flights (e.g., AirAsia X, Jetstar, Norwegian, Scoot), 
business class (e.g., airBaltic, Jetstar, Scoot), frequent flyer programs (Scoot), and 
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complimentary food and drinks. In contrast to the classic LCC operational model, 
European and US LCCs are expanding operations into primary airports (Dobruszkes, 
Givoni, & Vowles, 2017; Ferrer-Rosell & Coenders, 2017) and Asian LCCs have 
concentrated their expansion and growth flying between primary airports and cities 
(Bowen Jr, 2016). Ferrer-Rosell and Coenders (2017) called this a convergence of LCC 
and FSC, noting a blurring of the LCC and FSC business models.  
The convergence of LCC and FSC has prompted some researchers (e.g., 
Bachwich & Wittman, 2017) to describe an emerging market of ultra-low-cost carriers 
(ULCC). However, the U.S. airlines listed as ULCCs by Bachwich and Wittman (2017) 
(Allegiant, Frontier, and Spirit) all featured in ICAO’s (2017) list of recognized LCCs, 
and the features of the ULCCs are vey closely aligned to the traditional LCC operational 
model of Ryanair or Whizz. The ULCC branding is perhaps unique to the U.S. market, 
where LCCs such as Southwest and JetBlue charge airfares and offer services much 
closer to U.S. FSC pricing than do the European and Asian LCCs. Hence, ULCC is a 
U.S-centric term that IATA or ICAO do not use. 
Perception of Low-Cost Carrier Safety  
Airline safety is one of the most important factors that passengers consider when 
selecting an airline for travel (Jeeradista et al., 2016; Jiang, 2013; Milioti et al., 2015; 
Min & Min, 2015). Despite the importance that passengers place on airline safety, 
passengers have a poor understanding of actual airline performance. Passengers often 
perceive LCCs as less safe than FSCs, despite the lack of evidence to support that 
perception (Chang & Hung, 2013; Hagmann et al., 2015; Lu, 2017; Min & Min, 2015; 
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Wahyuni & Fernando, 2016). Passenger’s perception of airline safety is often incorrect 
and based on an airline’s image and service quality (Hagmann et al., 2015; Jeeradista et 
al., 2016; Milioti et al., 2015; Min & Min, 2015; Molin et al., 2017). The image of LLCs 
is not as good as that of FSCs, resulting in an incorrect passenger assumption that LLCs 
are less safe than FSCs (Chang & Hung, 2013; Fleischer et al., 2015; Milioti et al., 2015; 
Wahyuni & Fernando, 2016). Fleischer et al. (2015) remind us that information on flight 
safety is not easily obtainable by passengers, and in the absence of objective safety 
information, passengers will revert to their own subjective opinions and perceptions 
driven by airline image and the media. Tourists without flying experience and infrequent 
travelers have shown the greatest lack of understanding of airline safety, as found by 
Galambos, Deri, Dragin, Galambos, and Markovic (2014). 
Passengers are aware that the LCC operating model is to save money and reduce 
costs on all commercial aspects of a flight, and many passengers project this cost saving 
and reduction into safety aspects (Chang & Hung, 2013; Molin et al., 2017). As reported 
by Gao and Koo (2014), a common comment made by the public about LCCs, or even 
FSCs with lower fares, is that ‘you get what you pay for.’ Travelers assume that airlines 
charging airfares lower than the expected cost of production must be offering a poor 
quality or shoddy product (Savage, 2012). Thus, travelers attribute low airfares with low 
safety. Hagmann et al. (2015) found similar results when they compared the 
environmental image of airlines. Passengers rated prestigious airlines with good service 
reputations as significantly greener than LCCs, despite the opposite being true. The LCC 
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desire to save on operating costs such as fuel and having newer fleets resulted in better 
environmental scores (Hagmann et al., 2015). 
Indeed, even governments had acted on the misperception and misunderstanding 
of airline safety performance, as seen when the Indonesian Minister of Transport 
threatened to terminate all Indonesian LCCs and incorrectly stated that LCCs have a poor 
safety record compared to FSCs. The Minister stated that low prices must equate to low 
safety standards and cost-cutting on safety (Wahyuni & Fernando, 2016); an argument 
commonly stated by the media and public (Gao & Koo, 2014). The Indonesian 
government then put strict controls on LCCs but did not apply the same controls to FSCs. 
However, Wahyuni & Fernando (2016) reported that when the Indonesian safety 
regulator (the Director General of Civil Aviation) conducted a review of all 43 
Indonesian airlines, 26 of the 43, or more than 60% of airlines did not meet all safety 
requirements. The Indonesian study found LCCs that met all the safety requirements and 
FSCs who did not, highlighting that the negative safety perception of LCCs is incorrect 
and not reflected in objective data. 
Operational characteristics of LCCs, such as fast turnarounds and efficient 
maintenance are perceived as negatively impacting safety and showcasing the tension 
between safety and profit (Broderick, Emmel, Gierczak, & Gonzalez, 2017). Broderick et 
al. (2017) found no evidence that mechanics and engineers were under any greater 
pressure to cut corners or bypass procedures at one airline over another, or that more 
efficient maintenance programs impacted safety performance, nor any evidence that fast 
turnarounds had any impact on safety. Indeed, not all so-called ‘safety activities’ have a 
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positive effect on safety or reduce risk, and thus have no safety value (Rae & Alexander, 
2017). Safety activities that provide no additional safety assurance or value can result in a 
false assurance that safety goals are being achieved, which Rae and Alexander (2017) 
referred to as probative blindness. Probative blindness may be associated with some 
additional safety activities of FSCs; doing additional safety activities which do not 
improve safety or reduce risk. 
Passengers have rated flight safety as the most important factor when choosing to 
fly on FSCs, whereas passengers have rated airfare as the most important reason for 
choosing an LCC (Kim & Park, 2017; Lu, 2017; Milioti et al., 2015). Although, Jiang’s 
(2013) study of long-haul LCCs found that passengers rated safety as more important 
than cost. Passengers choose to fly FSCs as they are considered safer, and passengers are 
willing to pay a premium for what they perceive as high levels of safety (Fleischer et al., 
2015; Koo, Caponecchia, & Williamson, 2015; Lu, 2017; Molin et al., 2017). Even 
though the perception and public’s fear that some operating characteristics of LCCs may 
impact safety, Broderick et al. (2017) found no evidence to support such conclusions. 
Fleischer et al. (2015) found that passengers only distinguished between high safety 
airlines and airlines considered medium or low safety, which passengers grouped 
together. Thus, unless passengers consider LCC safety performance equal to FSC safety, 




Regulating Airline Safety 
The aviation safety regulator and its regulations are an organizational factor and 
defense in the Swiss cheese model and are part of the top-down influence on safety in 
Meshkati’s (2014) fortified Swiss cheese model. Indeed, the fortified Swiss cheese model 
depicts strong and independent regulatory oversight, and rigorous and proactive safety 
inspection, enforcement, and verification by the regulator to influence and impact system 
safety from the top-down (Meshkati, 2014). Regulatory oversight is also the basis for 
Shavell’s (1984) theory of controlling safety risk through regulation, which Faure (2014) 
updated and expanded.  
All airlines within a country must meet the same minimum regulatory standards 
of safety and security required by the national regulator (Yadav & Nikraz, 2014). Thus, 
within a country, both LCCs and FSCs should have similar levels of safety performance 
(Savage, 2012). National aviation regulators have varying levels of sophistication and 
resources to develop, implement, assure, and enforce safety regulations and programs, 
resulting in different safety performance between countries and regions (Faure, 2014; 
Oster et al., 2013; Savage, 2012). To compare aviation with another complex socio-
technical system, the oil and gas industry, Theophilus et al. (2017) stated that the lack of 
strong international and national oil and gas regulations and regulatory oversight have 
resulted in a progressive reduction of safety barriers and layers. Waring (2015) noted that 
questionable motivations and ineffectiveness of safety regulators in some industries and 
countries had a detrimental effect on safety. Thus, regulators play a fundamental role in 
the strength of organizational safety. 
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The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with 191 of the 192-
member states (countries) of the United Nations. The ICAO codifies the principles and 
techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of 
international air transport to ensure safe and orderly aviation operations. Yadav and 
Nikraz (2014) emphasized that the primary purpose of the ICAO’s aviation regulations 
and global standards is to ensure flight safety. Annex 19 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (ICAO, 2013a) is the ICAO document containing the 
international standards and recommended practices (ISARPS) for the management of 
aviation safety. Annex 19 is dedicated to the management of aviation safety and has 
several safety benefits including ensuring that safety risks are proactively identified, re-
enforcing the role of the State in managing safety at the country level, and reinforcing the 
concept of overall safety performance in all air transport domains. 
The global aviation system is complex with many interrelated activities required 
to assure the safe operation of aircraft. The ICAO developed the ISARPs in Annex 19 to 
assist countries in managing aviation safety risk (ICAO, 2013a). The ICAO bases its 
safety strategy on each country’s implementation of a State Safety Program (SSP) that 
systematically addresses safety risks at a country level. The SSP is an integrated set of 
regulations and activities aimed at improving safety. ICAO requires that each country 
establishes an SSP for the management of safety, to achieve an acceptable level of safety 
performance in air transportation (ICAO, 2013a). The objective of the SSP is to achieve 
an acceptable level of safety of aviation services and products delivered by aviation 
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service providers; airlines, air traffic control, airport operators, training, and engineering 
and maintenance organizations.  
The ICAO launched the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP) in 
response to widespread concerns about the adequacy of aviation safety oversight around 
the world (ICAO, 2016b). USOAP activities consist of regular audits of ICAO Member 
States' safety oversight systems. USOAP audits focus on a State's capability in providing 
safety oversight by assessing whether the State has effectively and consistently 
implemented the critical elements of a safety oversight system, which enable the State to 
implement safety-related ISARPS and associated procedures and guidance material 
(ICAO, 2016b) 
With 191-member states, ICAO’s USOAP audits require extensive resources, and 
as of December 2016, ICAO had still not conducted a USOAP audit of all member states 
(ICAO, n.d.). ICAO conducted around 30 USOAP audits per year (ICAO, 2016b). Thus, 
as Shavell (1984) and Faure (2014) noted, a limitation of controlling safety risk through 
regulation is the resource and effort required to ensure oversight. The weakness of 
regulation being dependent on enforcement is a potential reason for the poor aviation 
safety record of some countries and regions, particularly in developing regions with 
economic, political, resource, and competency constraints. 
Faure (2014) extended Shavell’s (1984) theory of controlling safety risk through 
regulation by adding insurance to the model. Faure suggested that three risk controls of 
regulations, liability, and insurance manage safety and accidents, and described the 
limitations of the three risk controls. A lack of information to private and legal parties, 
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the latency or long-tail effect of some risks, problems of proof and causality, and 
insolvency, all limit liability rules (Faure, 2014). Liability rules are ad-hoc and case-
specific; thus, they do little to improve risk across the industry. The static or slow-moving 
nature of regulations, their requirement for strict enforcement, their openness to influence 
by lobbying and private interests, and their failure to control unknown risks are limits to 
regulations (Faure, 2014). Faure stated that insurance could overcome the limitations of 
liability and regulation.  
Faure’s (2014) theory applies to the aviation industry where insurance is a 
common risk control due to the large costs associated with an airline accident. The 
weakness of regulation being dependent on enforcement is a potential reason for the poor 
aviation safety record of some countries and regions, particularly in the developing world 
which has economic, political, resource, and competency constraints. Aviation 
regulations, particularly in the security area, are prone to lobby groups and reactive, 
unthinking reactions 
A limitation of both Faure’s (2014) and Shavell’s (1984) theory is that both 
theories are based solely on economic and legal theory, not the practicalities and 
complexities of business. For example, Faure described insurance as creating a moral 
hazard because the risk of economic loss from a safety accident is covered by a third 
party. However, few managers in high-risk industries such as aviation would compromise 
safety knowing that insurance would cover economic losses. There are reputation and 
business sustainability issues to consider that relegate the moral hazard argument to the 
pages of irrelevant academic theory. A further weakness of Faure’s model is that it does 
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not account for the primary reason for global aviation regulation, and that is to ensure 
safe and efficient international operations. The purpose of the ICAO is to ensure safe 
international airline operations through global standards and rules. Faure’s theory does 
not account for the control of safety risk in that international aviation situation.  
Measuring Airline Safety 
Defining safety. Li, Yin, and Fan (2014) noted that it is not possible to directly 
observe safety. Safety is defined as the absence of hazards, danger, risk, or injury 
(Boholm, 2017; Selcuk, 2015), or the avoidance of failure (Kaspers et al., 2016), which 
better describes the properties of ‘unsafety’ than safety (Reason, 2000a). Reason (2000a) 
described the safety paradox that regulators and passengers define and measure safety 
more by its absence rather than its presence. Regulators and passengers commonly 
measure and view safety by failures such as accidents. Failures and accidents better 
measure ‘unsafety’ and the occasional absence of safety. Safety is about reducing the 
possibility of accidents, incidents, and harm (Kalemba & Campa-Planas, 2017). Aviation, 
or indeed any sociotechnical system can never be free from danger or risk. Hence, safety 
is more practically defined as a level of minimal or acceptable risk.  
The ICAO (2013a) defined safety as the state in which the possibility of harm or 
damage is reduced to, and maintained at, an acceptable level through a continuing 
process of identifying safety hazards and managing safety risk. Simply put, safety is 
about managing risk to an acceptable level (Kaspers et al., 2016), as the total elimination 
of all accidents or serious incidents is unachievable due to the sociotechnical nature of the 
complex aviation system (Reason, 2000a). Risk is not an observable item or outcome 
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either, as Boholm (2017) reminded us that risk within the operational field is the 
numerical product of the probability (or likelihood) and magnitude (or consequence) of 
an unwanted outcome. Thus, safety is both a construct and a concept.  
If safety is managing risk, the outcomes or consequences require definition, as 
does the likelihood or probability of the outcome or consequence. Using the ICAO’s 
(2013a) definition of harm to persons or damage to property, the most common outcome 
or consequence to base safety risk on is an airline accident. While safety may be a 
construct and concept that is not directly observable, the outcomes of safety are 
quantifiable; the absence or presence of accidents.  
Accidents, incidents, and near-miss. The most commonly used and thoroughly 
studied measure of safety performance in all transport activities including aviation is 
accidents. Both the ICAO and the IATA use accident data as the fundamental measure of 
airline safety performance and airline accident data is the primary metric used to examine 
aviation safety in the IATA and ICAO annual safety reports (IATA, 2017; ICAO, 2016a). 
In alignment with the ICAO’s (2013a) definition of safety, Neves (2015) 
described the concept of an acceptable level of safety performance derived from various 
safety performance indicators. The study was concerned with air traffic control (ATC) 
safety, but it is equally applicable to airline safety. Neves’ (2015) safety performance 
indicators included runway incursions, surface occurrences, and aeronautical accidents 
and incidents. ATC agencies commonly report the safety indicators noted by Neves, and 
the indicators are often publicly available. While Neves (2015) used a variety of safety 
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indicators to measure safety performance, the indicators were all reactive, outcome-based 
safety measures, consisting of various accident and incident types. 
Safety reporting is a measure of airline safety performance. Gnoni and Saleh 
(2017) described the advantages that proactive, near-miss safety reporting can bring, 
noting that proactive learning from near-miss events is less costly than reactive learning 
from accidents. Although, there is a gap between the theory that airlines will learn from 
minor and near-miss events and the reality of airlines rarely making safety improvements 
based on near-miss events (Madsen, Dillon, & Tinsley, 2016). While the safety value of 
low-risk, minor, and near-miss events is not disputed and is supported by many authors 
(e.g., Gnoni & Saleh, 2017; Madsen et al., 2016), these minor events are not common 
measures of safety performance between airlines, countries, and regions.  
Aircrew always report high-risk events such as accident and serious incidents as 
they are difficult to cover-up and cmust be reported by law. Low-risk events, such as 
near-misses, hazards, and minor incidents are under-reported and not reported 
consistently (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2016; Gnoni & Saleh, 2017; Oster et al., 2013; 
Savage, 2012). Airlines from different countries do not consistently report low risk and 
near-miss events, and reporting is subject to many pressures and variations, including 
such basic issues as a lack of consistent definitions (Savage, 2012). Even in countries 
with highly regulated, sophisticated aviation sectors, such as Australia and New Zealand, 
there is inconsistent and under-reporting (Gilbey et al., 2016), and the problem is even 
greater in developing regions (Oster et al., 2013). Both Koo et al. (2015) and Oster et al. 
(2013) noted that it is currently not possible to obtain accurate or consistent global 
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reporting on airline safety incidents due to the inconsistency in the data between airlines 
on minor safety events and the data is not publicly available (Savage, 2012). Measuring 
safety via low-risk events is better suited to within-airline analysis and trending, rather 
than as a valid and reliable universal measure of airline safety.  
A further challenge of using near-miss, low-risk, and minor safety events is the 
inconsistency of definitions between countries and within countries over time (Kaspers et 
al., 2016). For example, Zavila, Chmelik, and Dopaterova (2016) examined 67 years of 
military aviation accidents in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic and found the definitions 
of even basic safety changed several times over the period. Indeed, there are so many 
confounding factors to make a valid and reliable conclusion on safety, that low-risk 
events and near-misses cannot be credibly used as a negative or positive indicator of 
safety (Gnoni & Saleh, 2017). Indeed, Kaspers et al. (2017) and Kaspers et al. (2016) 
found no relationship between safety performance and various proactive safety measures 
such as elements and processes of airline safety management systems. Kaspers et al. 
(2016) suggested there is little relationship between safety processes and outcomes 
because such links are based on a simplistic, linear accident model held together by 
plausible reasoning, rather than using a complex, sociotechnical systems approach, such 
as Reason’s Swiss cheese model. 
Measuring safety performance through accidents. The most common measures 
of safety performance in transport studies are accidents and fatalities, as this is data that is 
commonly available and relatively accurate compared to other minor safety outcomes. 
Various authors have used accidents and fatal accidents to measure transportation safety 
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outcomes (see Table 2), indicating that accident-based metrics are used universally as the 
fundamental measure of safety outcome and performance. Accidents and accidents rates 
have been used to study aviation safety performance in military aviation (Zavila et al., 
2016).), airlines (Elvik & Elvebakk, 2016), general aviation (Boyd, 2016, 2015; Knecht, 
2013), air traffic control (Di Gravio, Mancini, Patriarca, & Costantino, 2015), airports, 
and civil aviation units (Chen & Li, 2016). Recent aviation research studies have 
compared airline safety to airline efficiency (Cui & Li, 2015), airline profitability (Wang, 
Hofer, & Dresner, 2013) and the general operational problems and challenges facing 
airlines (Oster et al., 2013). Those recent aviation studies used airline accidents, or a 
variation on them, to represent airline safety. Cui and Li (2015) used airline accidents as 
a measure of safety. Oster et al. (2013) used fatal accidents as the measure of safety, 
stating that the globally reliable and consistent nature of fatal airline accident data allows 





Transport Accident Studies Using Accidents to Measure Safety Outcomes 
 
Transport model Examples of research studies 
Shipping Bak & Gucma, 2016; Eleftheria, Apostolos, & Markos, 2016; Li et 
al, 2014; Mou et al., 2016 
Buses Goh, Currie, Sarvi, & Logan, 2014; Nirupama & Hafezi, 2014 
Trucks Guest, Boggess, & Duke, 2014; Mooren, Grzebieta, Williamson, 
Oliver, & Friswell, 2014 
Transit Liu & Moini, 2015 
Trams Naznin, Currie, Logan, & Sarvi, 2016a; Naznin, Currie, Logan, & 
Sarvi, 2016b 
Taxis Wang, Li, Du & Mao, 2015 
Bicycling Schepers, Twisk, Fishman, Fyhri, & Jensen, 2017; Vanparijs, Panis, 
Meeusen, & de Geus, 2015 
Motor vehicles, 
road, and road 
traffic 
Blattenberger, Fowles, & Loeb, 2013; Commandeur et al., 2013; 
Mehmandar, Soori, & Mehrabi, 2016; Silla et al., 2017; World 
Health Organization, 2015; Yannia et al., 2013; Yeo, Jang, 
Skabardonis, & Kang, 2013 
Road design  Barbosa, Cunto, Bezerra, & Nodari, 2014; Farid, Abdel-Aty, Lee, 
Eluru, & Wang, 2016 




Accidents and fatal accidents have also been the measure applied when 
comparing safety performance between transport modes such as trains, buses, airlines, 
and cars (Karimi et al., 2013; Liu & Moini, 2015; Savage, 2013). Both the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the European Union measure road safety performance based on 
fatal accidents (fatality numbers) and set global and European road safety targets around 
reduction of fatal accidents (WHO, 2015).  
Accident-based metrics are commonly used in aviation safety studies as accident 
data is readily available in the public domain, particularly when the accidents are major 
or fatal. The ICAO (2016c) provides definitions of accidents, incidents, and serious 
incidents which ensures a high level of consistency across countries and regions when 
reporting aviation accidents. ICAO also applies its filter to accidents when they publish 
their annual accident review (ICAO, 2016a).  
Both the ICAO and the IATA use airline accidents and accident rate (per million 
sectors) as their fundamental measures of airline safety performance (IATA, 2017; 
ICAO, 2016a). ICAO (2016c) stated that its primary indicator of safety in global air 
transport is the accident rate of scheduled commercial aircraft. Both Airbus and Boeing 
use accidents (hull loss and fatal accidents) and accident rates as their primary measures 
of aviation safety performance (Airbus, 2016; Boeing, 2017). Boeing (2017) use flight 
sectors or departures as the basis for calculating accident rates because there is a stronger 
correlation between accidents and departures than between accidents and flight hours or 
miles flown. Airbus (2016) supported Boeing’s findings, basing accident rates on the 
number of flights (departures), as flight hours are neutral to accident probability. Almost 
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80% of aircraft accidents occur during the take-off (taxi, take-off, and initial climb) and 
landing (approach and landing) phases, whereas cruise accounts for only 6% of accidents 
(Airbus, 2016). 
Safety indexes. Airline accidents are rare, and due to their rarity, they are not 
good predictors of safety. Proactive metrics of minor incidents can determine the level of 
safety and the likelihood of an accident outcome (Li et al., 2014). Outputs such as 
accidents and incidents can provide information on the underlying distribution of 
accident probability because safety is difficult to observe directly (Li et al., 2014). Safety 
indexes and composite indexes use a range of individual safety performance indicators to 
arrive at an overall safety score (Neves, 2015; Commandeur et al., 2013). Safety indexes 
and safety performance indicators have been used to compare safety performance in the 
fields of shipping (Li et al., 2014), road safety (Aarts & Houwing, 2015; Commandeur et 
al., 2013; Wang, et al., 2016; Yannia et al., 2013) and aviation (Chen & Li, 2016; Neves, 
2015; Pacheco, Fernandes, & Domingos, 2014). Even though safety indexes can 
overcome the limitation of solely using accidents to measure safety, most safety indexes 
still place the highest weighting on accidents (Aarts & Houwing, 2015; Chen & Li, 2016; 
Neves, 2015). Thus, accidents are the fundamental measure of safety. Aarts and Houwing 
(2015) noted that accidents and fatalities are the baselines for most comparisons of safety 
performance and for exploring the strength and directions of significant relationships 
between the safety performance indicators and accident outcomes. Pacheco et al. (2014) 
developed an airport safety index based on weather and terrain factors, but the authors 
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verified the index by using aircraft accident and incident data from the airports. These 
studies highlight that accidents are at the core of safety indexes. 
The limitation of safety indexes and safety performance indicators is that index 
constructs must be replicable and readily available across business units, countries, and 
regions. For example, the reliable comparison of reportable injuries between companies 
or countries requires the same definition of reportable injuries. However, the regulatory 
definition of reportable injuries is not the same, ranging from one to seven days 
depending on the country. Without a common standard, comparisons of safety 
performance indicators or safety indexes are invalid. Finally, Kaspers et al. (2016) argued 
that smaller events and incidents are only accident precursors in simplistic linear safety 
models, and do not reflect safety outcomes in complex, socio-technical systems such as 
aviation. 
Determining the safety performance of airlines requires a valid and reliable 
measurement of safety. Airline safety data must meet three criteria for inclusion in this 
doctoral study. Firstly, the safety data must be equally and consistently available for all 
airlines globally. Secondly, the safety data must be available historically and consistently 
to evaluate long-term trends. Thirdly, the safety data must be equally available for and 
applicable to both LCCs and FSCs. 
The IATA’s annual list of global airline accidents meets the requirements of 
global consistency, historical consistency, and global availability. Thus, the annual IATA 
accident list is the database for all the accidents used in this study. 
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Regional Safety Performance 
The ICAO, IATA, and OAG divide the world into regions, allowing for more 
consistent and relevant management and oversight of those regions. Although, the 
regional breakdowns are not consistent between the IATA, ICAO, and OAG, as 
highlighted in Table 3. While the IATA and OAG have the same regional headings, there 
are some differences between the countries within each region. I used OAG regional 
definitions this study. 
Table 3 
 
Comparison of Regions Between IATA, ICAO, and OAG   
 
IATA ICAO OAG 
Africa Africa Africa 
Middle East North Africa Middle East Middle East North Africa 
CIS Europe Eastern Europe/CIS 
Europe  Western Europe 
Latin America Pan America Latin America 
North America  North America 
Asia Pacific Asia Pacific Asia Pacific 
North Asia  North Asia 
 
Airline safety performance differs across the various regions of the world 
(Hodgson, Siemieniuch, & Hubbard, 2013; IATA, 2017; ICAO, 2017; Oster et al., 2013; 
Savage, 2012). The effectiveness of safety regulation and oversight between countries 
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reflects the different attitudes towards aviation safety between countries (Gilbey et al., 
2016; Herrera & Vasigh, 2009; Savage, 2012). The IATA calculates regional safety 
performance based on the annual accident rate within each region. Developing regions, 
such as Africa and Asia consistently have higher accident rates than developed regions, 
such as North America and Europe (Savage, 2012).  
Table 4 
IATA Regional Aviation Safety Performance Measured by Aircraft Accident Rate 
 Aircraft accident rate per million flights  




Africa 6.9 8.1 9.6 
Middle East/North Africa 0.5 3.3 5.0 
CIS 4.1 3.4 4.7 
Latin America 1.9 2.2 2.9 
Asia Pacific 1.5 2.8 2.7 
Europe 0.7 1.8 1.8 
North America 0.6 1.2 1.3 
North Asia 0.0 0.6 0.8 
Note. The IATA has only published overall accident rate in each region since 2009; 
hence a 10-year average sine 2007 cannot be determined. 
 
Table 4 notes the 2017 accident rates (per million departures), as well as five-year 
and eight-year accident rate averages. I derived the data from the regional accident rate 
published annually in the IATA Safety Report published between 2004 and 2018. The 
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data in Table 4 highlights the differences in regional safety performance, with Africa, the 
CIS, and the Middle East having accident rates five to ten times worse than those in 
Europe, North America, and North Asia. 
Regulatory factors. The aviation safety regulator and its regulations are an 
organizational factor and defense in the Swiss cheese model. All airlines within a country 
must meet the same minimum regulatory standards of safety and security set by the 
national regulator (Yadav & Nikraz, 2014). Thus, within a country, both LCCs and FSCs 
should have similar levels of safety performance. National aviation regulators have 
varying levels of sophistication to implement, assure, and enforce safety regulations and 
programs, resulting in different safety performance between countries and regions (Faure, 
2014; Herrera & Vasigh, 2009; Gilbey et al., 2016; Oster et al., 2013).  
Reason (2000a) noted that the growing public intolerance for third-party risk, 
environment damage, accidents, and work-related injury have heavily reduced accident 
rate in many domains (such as aviation). This public intolerance has resulted in 
increasingly comprehensive safety legislation in most industrialized nations. Even in the 
least responsible organizations in industrialized nations, merely keeping up with 
regulatory requirements results in the implementation of robust safety measures (Reason, 
2000a). Reason deliberately highlighted the emphasis and expectation of safety in 
industrialized nations; a difference reflected in the IATA regional safety data. 
Airline safety is heavily dependent on the local country implementation and 
enforcement of safety regulations. Industrialized nations are more developed and 
sophisticated in this regulatory role than developing nations. The result of this is that 
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airline safety levels are very similar within a country or region (Savage, 2012), but differ 
between countries, particularly industrialized and non-industrialized countries, and 
regions (Xu, 2015).  
National culture factors. Culture is the collective mental programming and 
conditioning shared with other members of a group (Hofstede, 1983, 2003). Shared 
beliefs and values that guide behavior and distinguish one group from another are 
fundamental to any definition of culture (Casey, Riseborough, & Krauss, 2015). National 
culture is a complex phenomenon due to multiple influencing factors and the large 
variations in national culture within a country. Substantial research exists on the topic of 
national culture and cultural traits and dimensions (Hofstede, 1983, 2003). Cultural traits 
and their impact have been studied in the aviation industry, including airline crew (Al-
Wardi, 2016; Chow, Yortsos, & Meshkati, 2014) and air traffic controllers (Noort, 
Reader, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2016; Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2015). Cultural 
traits influence crew operational and safety performance in several critical ways and have 
been cited as a contributing factor in airline and shipping accidents, such as Asiana 
Airline in San Francisco (Chow et al., 2014) and multiple accidents involving China 
Airlines and Korean Air (Hodgson et al., 2013). 
National culture influences risk perception and plays a role in important 
antecedents of safety behavior. Cultural traits also influence the relationships between 
leaders and team members, including the exchange of information, which impacts safety. 
(Starren, Hornikx, & Luijters, 2013). Safety climate, and ultimately safety performance, 
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is impacted by safety communication and the extent to which there is an open exchange 
of safety-related information (Barbaranelli, Petitta, & Probst, 2015).  
Gert Hofstede’s seminal research on cultural traits is the most widely cited and 
influential (Casey et al., 2015; Starren et al., 2013). Hofstede classified national culture 
along six dimensions: (1) Individualism vs. collectivism, (2) Power distance, (3) 
Uncertainty avoidance, (4) Masculinity, (5) Long-term orientation, and (6) Indulgence 
(Hofstede, 2003). Three dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
individualism-collectivism have repeatedly shown a relationship with safety outcomes 
and the safety culture environment (Casey et al., 2015; Hodgson et al., 2013; Noort et al., 
2016).  
Power distance. Power distance refers to the degree of acceptance by individuals 
within a group to an unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 1983, 2003). In a low 
power distance culture, the degree of inequality is low, and there is interdependence 
between subordinates and superiors, providing an opportunity for coordination, 
consultation, and if necessary, questioning and challenging of the superior by 
subordinates (Al-Wardi, 2016; Levitt, 2014). High power distance cultures more easily 
and unquestioningly comply with instructions and demands from supervisors, even when 
those demands compromise safety (Casey et al., 2015; Starren et al., 2013). The high 
power distance crews have decisions made by the Captain, with little or no input from the 
crew, and commands are carried out unquestioningly by the junior crew (Barbaranelli et 
al., 2015; Chow et al., 2014). While this can speed up the decision-making process and 
bring time efficiencies, it has the negative effects of not including other opinions or ideas 
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and crew are less likely to raise issues and safety concerns, both of which can result in the 
implementation unsafe or wrong decisions (Hodgson et al., 2013).  
High power distance and collectivism may act as a barrier to effective safety 
communications (Casey et al., 2015). Teams from high power distance, collectivist 
cultures are less likely to communicate openly with leaders about safety issues (e.g., 
hazards, risks, incidents) or report performance-related issues (e.g., errors, mistakes). 
High power distance and authoritarian cultures result in junior crew failing to 
communicate openly with senior crew or raise errors and mistakes, and senior crew 
unwilling to share information (Chow et al., 2014; Noort et al., 2016).  
High power-distance impacts risk-tasking behavior, as senior staff may not even 
be willing to admit mistakes and errors, seeing them as a sign of incompetence (Prati & 
Pietrantoni, 2014). The cultural trait of ‘face’ can result in taking greater risk-taking, due 
to crew not wanting to lose face or senior crew not wanting to admit mistakes or inability 
(Levitt, 2014). Chow et al. (2014) cited the example of the Korean Air accident in San 
Francisco, where the Captain elected to conduct a non-precision visual approach because 
other airlines were conducting a visual approach and the Korean captain did not want to 
lose face and admit that he could not conduct a non-precision visual approach. 
Individualism–collectivism. Individualism–collectivism relates to the degree of 
responsibility that people are ready to take in looking after themselves and their 
connections within a group (Hofstede, 1983, 2003). In a high individualism culture, 
individuals are expected to look after themselves, and self-satisfaction is valued (Al-
Wardi, 2016; Levitt, 2014). In the workplace, the task achievement is more important 
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than maintaining harmony and relationships. A collectivist culture stresses the 
importance of loyalty, deep relationships, and harmony within the team. Personal 
connections override the task (Al-Wardi, 2016).  
Collectivism and high power distance have been associated with an unwillingness 
to voluntarily report errors and incidents (Barbaranelli et al., 2015; Casey et al., 2015; 
Noort et al., 2016). Collectivist cultures predispose team members to avoid reporting 
errors and safety concerns so as not to bring shame or embarrassment to the team and 
maintain harmony (Casey et al., 2015).  
Uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance focuses on the experience when 
faced with risk or uncertainty and the way of managing the situation (Hofstede, 1983, 
2003). People in a high uncertainty avoidance culture need structure in their environment 
and relationships so that they can predict situations and outcomes. A high uncertainty 
avoidance society use controls, structure, rules, and regulations to reduce uncertainty (Al-
Wardi, 2016) and employees prefer to follow standard procedures, with guidance and 
instruction given. In low uncertainty avoidance cultures, there are fewer rules and 
procedures, and individuals are encouraged to develop new views and practices and act 
outside the procedures if necessary (Al-Wardi, 2016). Low uncertainty avoidance 
cultures are more comfortable with ambiguity and flexibility in operational situations 
(Barbaranelli et al., 2015). Noort et al.’s (2016) study of over 13,600 air traffic 
controllers across 21 European countries found that high uncertainty avoidance was 
negatively associated with safety culture. High uncertainty avoidance was associated with 
less innovation in decision making, greater reliability on formal procedures and 
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protocols, less flexibility to act on new or emerging information and risk, reduced 
tolerance for diverse opinions, and reduced willingness to report errors and incidents. 
Employees from national cultures with higher uncertainty avoidance are highly 
focused on rules and procedural compliance (Starren et al., 2013). While procedural 
compliance is positive, it can also result in crew rigidly following procedures, commands, 
and decisions even when it is clear the crew should reconsider or reframe the procedure, 
command, or decision (Hodgson et al., 2013). The result is slow decision-making and 
slow decision change in the face of new information. 
In summary, the cultural traits of high power distance, low individualism, and 
high uncertainty can have a negative impact on safety behavior, safety culture, and 
ultimately safety performance and accidents. Thus, national and regional cultures 
displaying these traits might encounter higher accident rates. 
Socioeconomic factors. In comparison to developed regions, safety in less 
developed countries and regions is not as high a priority due to less mature approaches to 
safety management, an emphasis on production over safety, and a lack of resources to 
invest in safety initiatives (Casey et al., 2015). In response to several studies that found a 
correlation between national scores of power-distance and accident rates, Hofstede 
(2003) re-examined the data with the addition of gross national product (GNP) per capita, 
and found the GNP per capita was the dominant variable, rather than power-distance. 
Hodgson et al. (2013) updated Hofstede’s (2003) research with an additional 17 years of 
accident data and found that GNP per capita was the largest single factor in airline 
accident rates. High power distance, low individualism (high collectivism), and high 
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uncertainty avoidance all had a negative correlation with GNP per capita. Although, some 
‘Asian tiger’ countries such as Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are outliers due to the high 
GNP per capita.  
Xu (2015) also found correlations between a country’s GDP per capita and its 
airline accident rate, with higher GDP per capita resulting in better safety performance. 
Xu noted that industrialized countries have stronger economic performance, more 
stringent regulatory standards, and stronger law enforcement, which correlated with 
better airline safety performance. Savage (2012) noted that countries within the same 
region, and thus having similar socio-economic situations, usually have indistinguishable 
airline safety records. However, the differences in airline safety performance between 
regions is significant (Savage, 2012). Safety studies in other transport modes such as 
driving have found increased accident and fatality rates related to less developed 
countries for reasons such as poorly designed and maintained roads, older or unsafe 
vehicles, poor infrastructure, and poorly developed and enforced safety regulations 
(Sengoelge, Laflamme, & El-Khatib, 2018). The reasons for poor road safety in less 
developed countries are like the reasons for poor airline safety in the same countries and 
regions. 
The relationships and interactions between a country’s economic wealth, 
dominant cultural traits, and the geopolitical situation are complex and beyond the scope 
of this study. However, safety performance and safety culture differ between countries 
and regions. A country’s economic wealth, dominant cultural traits, and the geopolitical 
situation, all impact the effectiveness of the aviation safety regulatory system. 
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Fleet factors. Another possible reason for the difference in safety performance 
between regions is operational fleet factors. Turbine-propeller (turbo-prop) and Eastern-
built aircraft (e.g., Sukhoi, Mikoyan MiG, Tupolev, Ilyushin, Yakovlev Yak) are over-
represented in aircraft accidents (IATA, 2017). Eastern-built aircraft are also more 
common in Africa, Middle East, CIS/Eastern Europe, and Latin America compared to 
North America, Europe, and Asia. Further, fleet age impacts airline safety performance 
(Herrera & Vasigh, 2009). First, second, and third generation aircraft are less safe than 
modern fourth generation aircraft as they are over-represented in airline accidents 
(Airbus, 2016; Boeing, 2017). Older generation aircraft are more common in less 
developed regions such as Africa and Latin America, impacting safety performance in 
those regions (Herrera & Vasigh, 2009).  
Transition  
Section 1 covered the foundation of this study. In this section, I started with a 
description of the background of the study and I followed with the problem statement, the 
purpose statement, and the nature of the study. I then presented the research questions, 
hypotheses, and theoretical framework that guided the study. Section 1 also defined the 
relevant terms, the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations underlining the study, as 
well as the significance of the study. Finally, Section 1 contained a critical analysis and 
synthesis of the literature related to the study and the study variables. 
Section 2 covers the nature and structure of the research study and its design, 
including the steps involved in collecting, validating, and analyzing the data. I justify the 
population and sampling method, and description of the survey instrument, techniques, 
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and analysis methods. Finally, in Section 2, I examine the reliability and validity. Section 
3 contains the presentation and analysis of the results and findings. I discuss the 
application to professional practice, implications for social change, and recommendations 




Section 2: The Project 
In Section 2, I discuss the purpose of the study, the role of the researcher, and the 
selected research method and design. I provide information on the collection and analysis 
of data, as well as addressing any ethical issues. Finally, I discuss the reliability and 
validity of the study. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between airline category, geographical region, and safety performance. The 
independent variables were the category of an airline classified as an LCC or FSC and the 
regional geographic base of the airline. The dependent variable was the safety 
performance measured by aircraft accidents. The target population comprised archival 
data records of global passenger airlines. The implications for positive social change 
include the potential for airline leaders to improve the safety image of their airline and 
provide passengers a better understanding of airline safety. Providing passengers with 
information on airline safety performance is beneficial for nervous flyers (Graham & 
Metz, 2017) and may allow passengers to make more informed choices on using different 
categories of airlines in different geographical regions. The research may result in new 
travel opportunities for travelers that were previously unrealized due to safety concerns. 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher in the data collection and analysis process in a 
quantitative study is to ensure an adequate sample size, as well as consistency, reliability, 
and validity of the data and the analysis (Kyvik, 2013). Castellan (2010) summarized that 
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in quantitative research, the researcher is an external observer exploring relationships 
between variables, remaining detached and independent and thus has a neutral role. My 
role in the data collection and analysis for this study was the retrieval and analysis of 
archived airline and safety data from publicly available websites and publications. My 
research method was the quantitative analysis of archived data, and I did not use any 
surveys, interviews, or participants. Maintaining independence in data collection and 
analysis is important. During the data collection process, the researcher should mitigate 
any bias to avoid influencing the outcome (Daigneault, 2014). Although, Fassinger and 
Morrow (2013) cautioned that regardless of the objectivity of the research methods and 
efforts of the researcher to remove bias, the cultural background, attitudes, and values of 
the researcher will permeate the research. Acknowledging and identifying any potential 
research bias is a step towards mitigating any potential researcher bias. 
At the time the study was conducted, I was not employed in the airline industry, 
reducing any potential bias. Conducting quantitative research with archived data ensured 
that I remained independent of the variables as I determined the relationship between 
them. The Belmont Report ethical protocols did not impact my research as the archival 
data was all publicly available and there were no participants in the study.  
Participants 
No airlines, organizations, or individuals took part in the study. I used publicly 
available archive data from the IATA, ICAO, and OAG. Thus, I did not require any 
participants for this study.  
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Research Method and Design  
Research Method 
I chose a quantitative methodology for this study. Airline accident rates are the 
most common measure of safety performance (Cui & Li, 2015; Neves, 2015; Oster et al., 
2013), and the use of accident numbers and rates lends itself to quantitative analysis. 
Quantitative studies allow the identification of statistical results to describe or detect 
changes in numerical characteristics of the population under study, explore relationships 
between the variables, and test hypotheses (Castellan, 2010; Paul & Garg, 2014; Yilmaz, 
2013), which was the purpose of my study. The goal of quantitative analysis is to 
establish valid and reliable facts and to predict and test hypotheses (Castellan, 2010; 
Yilmaz, 2013), which was the goal of my research. Yilmaz (2013) noted that the 
statistical data in quantitative research allows for the succinct and parsimonious summary 
of major patterns across broad scales and situations. In my study, the population was all 
passenger airlines categorized as LCC or FSC across all global regions, and the numerical 
characteristic was safety performance measured by accidents. The quantitative method 
was appropriate for this study because the purpose of the study was to analyze objective 
numerical safety data and determine statistical relationships between variables that I 
could generalize across the airline industry. Further, quantitative statistical analysis is 
suited to my broad, global data set of all passenger airlines in the world. 
Quantitative methods are used to test a theory deductively rather than developing 
a theory inductively, as would be the case with qualitative research (Guetterman et al., 
2015; Yilmaz, 2013). Qualitative methods are appropriate when the research intent is to 
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explore the human side of business practice and process in their natural setting, how 
people make sense and meaning, and what their lived experiences, perceptions, and 
attitudes represent (Gergen, Josselson, & Freeman, 2015; McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015; 
Yilmaz, 2013). Qualitative methods do not allow the determination of statistically 
significant variable relationships. A mixed methods study contains the attributes of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Guetterman et al., 2015). The intent of my study 
was the statistical analysis of numerical data, making qualitative and mixed-method 
approaches inappropriate.  
Research Design 
Nonexperimental research compares differences and explores relationships 
between variables (Castellan, 2010; Cor, 2016). Correlation is the statistical measure of 
how closely and in what direction two variables are related (Emerson, 2015). Researchers 
use Pearson correlational analysis to explore linear relationships between variables 
(Altman & Krzywinski, 2015a; Sari et al., 2017). A correlation design allows the 
examination of the relationship between or among two or more variables, rather than to 
assume or determine cause and effect (Altman & Krzywinski, 2015a; Prion & Haerling, 
2014). Studies using archival data employ correlation designs (Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, 
& Reade, 2016). The use of a correlational design with Pearson’s r allows for the 
measurement of variable strength and relationship (Prion & Haerling, 2014; Puth, 
Neuhauser, & Ruxton, 2014). The objective of my study was to determine the 
relationship between the nominal independent variables of airline category categorized as 
LCC or FSC and airline geographical location, and a ratio dependent variable of safety 
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performance measured by accidents. Hence, a correlation design was appropriate for this 
study. 
Other designs, such as experimental and quasi-experimental designs are 
appropriate for assessing cause and effect (Castellan, 2010; Cor, 2016; Froman & Owen, 
2014). Experimental researchers have control over one or more of the variables and 
manipulate the variables to test hypotheses (Brouwers, Wiggins, Helton, O’Hare, & 
Griffin, 2016; Castellan, 2010). The objective of this study was to examine the 
differences and relationship between variables, not to assess cause and effect. Further, I 
had no control or influence over any of the variables. Thus, the experimental and quasi-
experimental designs were not appropriate. 
Case study and phenomenological research designs are used to study the human 
complexity of real-life issues and processes through individuals and small group 
interviews (Gee, Loewenthal, & Cayne, 2013; Hampshire, Iqbal, Blell, & Simpson, 2014; 
Sutton & Austin, 2015). Case study and phenomenological research are qualitative 
methods, using interviews and observations in naturalistic settings to understand complex 
people-based managerial issues and organizational processes (Gee et al., 2013; Sutton & 
Austin, 2015; Yilmaz, 2013). Lalor et al. (2013) noted that case study research is 
appropriate when exploring how and why questions. Researchers can rarely generalize 
case study research beyond the cases under study (Lalor et al., 2013). Thus, case study 
and phenomenological research designs were not appropriate for the quantitative analysis 
of airline safety using archival accident data. 
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Population and Sampling 
Population 
A population does not necessarily refer to people but can also refer to the total 
quantity of things or cases that are the subject of the research (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 
2016). The dependent variable in this study was safety performance measured by airline 
accidents. Thus, the population was all airlines that have had accidents, for which the 
IATA airline accident data archives were the most relevant and appropriate records. The 
IATA’s accident data archive is highly reliable and is consistent across time and regions. 
I used ICAO’s (2017) list of LCCs to categorize the airlines as LCC or FSC. Based on the 
airline’s country of registration, I placed the airlines into regions based on the OAG’s 
(2018) regional breakdown. The OAG regional breakdown is in Appendix B. These 
archived records were the primary data I used for the quantitative analysis of this study. 
Thygesen & Ersboll (2014) noted that archive and register-based populations and data are 
well-suited to total population sampling. 
The airline accident data consisted of all the passenger airline accidents listed by 
the IATA in their annual safety reports for the 14-year period from 2004 to 2017. I 
excluded cargo and ferry flights, as those aviation operations are not passenger operations 
and were not relevant to this study.  
Sampling 
A sample is a subset of the population (Acharya, Prakash, Saxena, & Nigam, 
2013). I used a nonprobabilistic sampling technique called total population sampling, 
which is a subset of purposive sampling. Nonprobabilistic purposive sampling occurs 
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when researchers select subjects from the target population based on their fit with the 
purpose of the study and specific inclusion and exclusion criteria (Acharya et al., 2013; 
Etikan et al., 2016; Suen, Huang, & Lee, 2014). Total population sampling is a type of 
purposive sampling where the researcher examines the entire population that has the 
attribute or trait (Etikan et al., 2016; Thygesen & Ersboll, 2014). Total population 
sampling is appropriate and possible when the population size is relatively small, and the 
total population pool is known and accessible, allowing a researcher to use the total 
population as the sample (Etikan et al., 2016; Thygesen & Ersboll, 2014). In this study, 
the traits of the airline population were passenger airlines that have had an accident, 
which provided a relatively small population of about 70 subject airlines per year.  
Nonprobabilistic sampling is more common in qualitative research than 
quantitative research, where probability-based sampling is the preferred sampling method 
and the sample size is based on statistical power rather than data saturation (Catania, 
Dolcini, Orellana, & Narayanan, 2015; Etikan et al., 2016; Suen et al., 2014). Probability 
sampling requires random sampling of the population, whereas randomization is not 
important in selecting a sample from the population in nonprobability sampling (Etikan et 
al., 2016). Nonprobabilistic sampling is acceptable for research that involves a specific 
and targeted population sample (Stern, Bilgen, & Dillman, 2014). Acharya et al. (2013), 
Etikan et al. (2016), and Wilson (2014) stated that nonprobability sampling has the 
limitation of researcher bias and sample selection bias, resulting in difficulties in 
generalizing the results beyond the sample. However, these limitations are more 
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applicable to convenience sampling, which is the most common form of nonprobabilistic 
sampling (Acharya et al., 2013).  
The American Association for Public Opinion Research noted that under certain 
conditions, nonprobability sampling is appropriate for making statistical inferences 
(Baker et al., 2013). Buseh, Kelber, Millon-Underwood, Stevens, and Townsend (2013) 
used nonprobabilistic sampling in their quantitative study that included correlation and 
multivariate linear regression analysis. Daigneault (2014), Palinkas et al. (2015), and 
Thygesen and Ersboll (2014) all concluded that a nonprobabilistic, purposive sampling 
strategy could generate quantitative data, and purposive sampling is becoming an 
increasingly popular sampling technique in quantitative research. Quantitative methods 
emphasize the breadth of understanding, as opposed to qualitative methods, which 
emphasize the depth (Palinkas et al., 2015). Using the entire population as the sample 
ensures research breadth, as the knowledge gained represents the population from which 
it was drawn (Palinkas et al., 2015). 
Probability sampling is without bias and subjectivity as every element or subject 
in the population has an equal and known probability of sample selection (Wilson, 2014). 
Using the total population as the sample for my study removed any sampling bias and 
subjectivity and made statistical inferences appropriate (Thygesen & Ersboll, 2014). All 
subjects in the population of airlines that have had accidents had the same 100% chance 
of being selected, which is a sampling trait more aligned with probability sampling. 
Indeed, calling the population in this study a sample is misleading, because a sample is a 
subset of a population, whereas the subjects in this study were the entire population. 
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Statistical analysis of sampling error, effect size, and power analysis are not relevant 
when the sample is the entire population (Thygesen & Ersboll, 2014). Although, Millis 
(2003) suggested that when faced with a fixed sample or population size, a power 
analysis can help researchers select outcome measures and values with maximum 
sensitivity. 
 
Figure 6. Power as a function of sample size for multiple linear regression. 
Statistical power refers to a statistical test’s sensitivity to differences and 
relationships between groups or conditions. I used Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner’s, 
(2007) G*Power 3.1 program to conduct an a priori calculation of sample size. The 
sample size required to achieve an effect size of f = 0.10, α = 0.05, and power β = 0.90 




I did not use participants and organizations in the study; thus, I did not require 
informed consent. The data on airline category (LCC or FSC), geographical region, and 
safety performance measured by accidents were archival data in the public domain. The 
data did not contain names of individuals or other confidential or sensitive information. 
No ethical concerns existed with data used in my analysis. Due to the public nature of the 
archival data used in my research, I submitted a simplified version of IRB submission for 
public archive research. My Walden IRB approval number was 03-01-18-0665148. 
Data Collection Instruments 
I used public archive data from the IATA, ICAO, and OAG in this study. No 
surveys, interviews, or participants were used, nor were any pre-existing instruments for 
the data collection. I measured all the study variables with public archive data accessible 
online. 
The dependent variable in the study was airline safety performance. The 
independent variables were the type of airline (LCC or FSC) and geographic region of 
registration. Both dependent variables were nominal data. Airline acccidents are a 
common measure of airline safety performance (Boyd, 2016, 2015; Cui & Li, 2015; 
Knecht, 2013; Oster et al., 2013). I used passenger airline accidents (ratio data) as defined 
by the IATA and listed in the IATA annual safety reports. I excluded cargo and ferry 
flights from the data. The IATA cross-references and harmonizes its accident list with the 
ICAO to ensure that all airline accident that occurred in the world each year are reliably 
and consistently captured (ICAO, 2013b). I chose the IATA accident list as the historical 
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accident data covered the 14-year period of the study and can be updated for future 
studies. ICAO has published the accident database in their annual safety report since 
2012. Thus, ICAO accident data could not be used for this research as it did not cover the 
14-year period of the study dating back to 2004. The IATA accident data is historically 
stable as they have used the same definition of accident throughout the study data. 
Changing definitions and criteria is a data reliability issue identified in other archival 
studies on aviation safety (Zavila et al., 2016).   
Airline categorization as LCC or FSC (nominal data) was based on ICAO’s 
(2017) list of LCCs. The database contained all current and defunct airlines in all 
countries that ICAO categorized as LCC. As the global regulator, ICAO is a valid and 
reliable source of LCC categorization data applied to the global fleet. If an airline 
changed category from LCC to FSC (e.g., Virgin Blue to Virgin Australia) or FSC to 
LCC (e.g., Hong Kong Express to HK Express), it was categorized as LCC or FSC for 
the relative period that it was an LCC or FSC. The ICAO LCC list contains notes on the 
history and changes to the airlines listed. 
A common denominator of operational scale is required to enable a comparison of 
safety between LCC and FSC, as well as between regions. The number of flights, miles 
flown, or passengers carried is often used to compare airline safety performance (Airbus, 
2016; IATA, 2017; ICAO, 2017; Oster et al., 2013). I used the number of aircraft flights, 
commonly referred to as departures, to normalize the accident data as accidents per 
million departures. Accidents per million departures are the primary measure of airline 
safety by Airbus (2016), Boeing (2017), IATA (2017), and ICAO (2017), as well as 
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being a common measure in the academic literature (Oster et al., 2013). Aircraft flight 
data was obtained from OAG, which was broken down by airline category and region. 
Thus, I calculated both LCC and FSC accidents per million departures in all regions, 
providing ratio data for robust statistical analysis. 
I allocated airlines to countries according to their aircraft registration. Countries, 
and hence airlines, were placed in geographical regions (nominal data) according to OAG 
definitions of regions. OAG regional definitions were used instead of IATA or ICAO 
definitions as I based the airline departures data for regions on the OAG data. Thus, I 
allocated airlines (LCC and FSC) to geographical regions according to OAG definitions 
(refer to Annex B for regional definitions) 
Data Collection Technique 
Archival data is considered public record data (Tesar, 2015) or any existing 
information collected by others, amenable to systematic study (Jones, 2010; Simnett, 
Carson, & Vanstraelen, 2016). Through the growth of the internet and electronic media, 
public and company records, and electronic and online databases, archived data are 
increasing in quantity and quality, resulting in the increasing popularity of archival 
research (Onyancha, Ngoepe, & Maluleka, 2015; Rhee, 2015; Tesar, 2015). Archival 
research is also becoming more common in university research settings. Daniels and 
Yakel (2013) and Defond and Zhang (2014) called archival research a burgeoning line of 
research. Archival research is a common research method in many fields including 
economics, astronomy, anthropology, history, sociology, organisational and industrial 
psychology, health care, and auditing and assurance (Cheng & Phillips, 2014; Clary-
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Lemon, 2014; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Ivanov, 2017; Jones, 2010; Simnett et al., 2016). 
Dikolli et al. (2013) described the advantages of using archival research to supplement 
and complement experimental research, as demonstrated by Kilduff et al. (2016). 
There are other advantages to using archival data for research; the data already 
exists, the dataset may be the total population, and the data were collected independently 
of the study reducing researcher bias (Shultz, Hoffman, & Reiter-Palmon, 2005; Simnett 
et al., 2016; Thygesen & Ersboll, 2014). Use of archival data can save time, resource, and 
costs (Cheng & Phillips, 2014). Archival data can overcome the problem that many 
organizations are conservative about having outsiders conduct research within or on their 
organization, avoiding the potential issues of resources, interruption, and challenging 
findings (Shultz et al., 2005). Archive datasets are often larger than a single researcher 
can collect, and they can include international and longitudinal data (Shultz et al., 2005), 
like the14-year period of global airline accident data used in this study. Further, archival 
data has the advantages that it does not require participants for the study and public 
archive data can be obtained and analyzed with minimal ethical issues.  
The disadvantages of using archive and register data are that the data is limited to 
the variables recorded, data may be missing or incomplete, and the data cannot be added 
to or tailored to any current research (Cheng & Phillips, 2014; Shultz et al., 2005). The 
data and archive may not be set-up for academic research purposes (Simnett et al., 2016). 
The availability and quality of the data may be questionable in some instances, with 
errors difficult to detect (Shultz et al., 2005). However, the data in some official and 
widely-used archives can be considered highly reliable due to the professional data entry 
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and multiple checks to minimize errors, omission, and duplications (Cheng & Phillips, 
2014; Simnett et al., 2016). International archive data may have endogeneity concerns, 
with a multitude of cultural, institutional, and regulatory factors contributing to 
endogenous results (Simnett et al., 2016). Although, the international data for my 
research came from the single IATA database, cross-checked against the ICAO database, 
thus minimizing endogeneity factors. 
I collated several data sources (IATA accidents, IAG regions and departure 
frequency, and ICAO airline categorization) to overcome the challenge that no single 
data source contained all the information I required for my analysis. Cheng and Phillips 
(2014) described the advantages of cross-linking information from different archive data 
sources, such as I did. 
My research aim was to explore the relationship between airline category (LCC or 
FSC), geographical region, and safety performance measured by accidents. I sourced data 
on aircraft accidents from IATA’s annual safety reports, which provided a list of all 
airline accidents each year from 2004 to 2017. The IATA accident data is publicly 
available and historically stable as the definition of an accident did not change. The 
IATA accident data covered all airlines in all countries for the 14-year period of my 
analysis.  Finally, the IATA data is valid and reliable as IATA and ICAO harmonize and 
cross-check their accident data against each other to ensure a complete and harmonious 
record of airline accidents. The OAG makeup of geographical regions was sourced 
directly from OAG and is listed in Appendix B. Combing the OAG regional information 
with the IATA accident data allowed for geographical data analysis. The ICAO LCC list 
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was also added to the IATA airline accident lists, allowing for LCC and FSC accident 
analysis. Airline departures data for regions and airline category was obtained from 
OAG, allowing accident data to be normalized as accidents per million departures. The 
safety performance data classified by airline category and geographical region is in 
Appendix A. 
Data Analysis 
RQ: What is the relationship between airline category, geographical region, and 
safety performance?  
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between airline category, 
geographical region, and safety performance.  
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between airline category, 
geographical region, and safety performance.  
Airline category (LCC or FSC) and geographical region were both nominal data. 
Variables in each category were mutually exclusive; an airline is either or LCC or FSC 
but cannot be both. An airline can only be registered in a single country, and hence was 
exclusive to a single region.  
Correlation is the statistical measure of how closely and in what direction two 
variables are related (Emerson, 2015), and Pearson correlations explore linear 
relationships between variables (Altman & Krzywinski, 2015a; Sari et al., 2017). A 
correlation design allows the examination of the relationship between or among two or 
more variables (Altman & Krzywinski, 2015a; Prion & Haerling, 2014; Uyanik & Guler, 
2013). Correlation designs analyze the relationship between multiple independent 
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variables and a continuous dependent variable (Green & Salkind, 2017). Regardless of 
the correlation strength between the variables, correlation does not imply causality 
(Froman & Owen, 2014). The objective of this study was to determine the relationship 
between the nominal independent variables of airline category categorized as LCC or 
FSC and airline geographical location, and a ratio dependent variable of safety 
performance measured by accidents (per million departures) Hence, I chose a correlation 
design for this study. 
Regression analysis is a statistical technique for estimating the correlations or 
relationship among variables (Altman & Krzywinski, 2015b). Regression provides a 
means of predicting one dependent variable from the other independent predictor 
variables (Crawford, 2006). Regression models with one dependent variable and two or 
more independent variables are called multilinear or multiple regression (Uyanik & 
Guler, 2013). To address the research question in my study with a quantitative 
correlational design, I used multiple linear regression to examine the relationship between 
the independent variables (also known as the predictor or regressor variables) of airline 
category and geographical region and the dependent or response variable of airline safety 
performance (accidents per million departures). In multiple linear regression, rejection of 
the null hypothesis implies that the independent or predictor variables (airline category 
and geographical region) have a significant effect on the dependent or response variable 
(airline safety performance). Uyanik and Guler (2013) stated that multiple linear 
regression analysis could answer such research questions as, are there any relationships 
between independent and dependent variables, and if there are relationships, what is the 
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power of the relationship, and is it possible to make predictions regarding the dependent 
variable. Due to the predictive qualities of regression analysis and ability to describe 
relationships between variables (Uyanik & Guler, 2013), the regression analysis was the 
optimal statistical method to test my hypothesis and answer my research question. 
The objective in testing the null hypothesis was to determine if a linear 
relationship exists between the independent or predictor variables of airline category 
(LCC or FSC) and geographical region, and the dependent or response variable of airline 
safety performance measured by accidents and normalized per million departures. Simple 
univariate linear regression and logistic regressions are an alternative form of regression 
analysis. Simple univariate linear regression is suitable for use with a single independent 
and single dependent variable (Altman & Krzywinski, 2015b; Uyanik & Guler, 2013). 
Logistic regression is suitable for determining nonlinear relationships between variables 
and for studies with multiple or categorical dependent variables (Lever, Krzywinski, & 
Altman, 2016). Neither of these conditions was relevant or applicable to my study. 
Hence, I did not use tests for simple univariate and logistic regression. 
This research study also explored whether there is a difference in safety 
performance between LCCs and FSCs, as well as any differences between the safety 
performance of global regions. Thus, the study examines the difference between the 
independent groups of airline category (LCC and FSC) and global region (eight global 
regions). The dependent variable is safety performance measured by accident rate per 
million departures. These research conditions are the required elements for using 
independent samples t-test analysis (comparing two groups) and ANOVA (comparing 
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three or more groups) (Green & Salkind, 2017; Rietveld & van Hout, 2015). The purpose 
of the independent samples t test and ANOVA is to determine if there is a statistically 
significant difference between the mean scores of the independent groups (Pandis, 2015). 
There was no missing data in my study, as all airline accidents for the 14-year 
period were captured, all airlines were categorized as LCC or FSC, and all airlines were 
allocated to a geographical region. The number of airline departures was available for 
each region for the entire period. Thus, there was no missing data in the variables. The 
data from the IATA, ICAO, and OAG was entered into an MS Excel file, then transferred 
to SPSS for statistical analysis. SPSS is a statistical software program commonly used for 
data analysis, including correlation analysis in aviation safety studies (Chen & Li, 2013; 
Kolmos, 2017; Saleh, Suwandi, & Hamidah, 2016). The safety performance data 
classified by airline category and geographical region is in Appendix A. 
Study Validity 
Research validity is a requirement for scientific rigor (Morse, 2015). Validity 
refers to the accuracy of research data (Yilmaz, 2013) and the ability to draw justifiable 
and accurate inferences and conclusions about a population from the data (Ellis & Levy, 
2009; Govaerts, 2015; McKibben & Silvia, 2016; Morse, 2015). Heale and Twycross 
(2015) noted that validity is the extent to which a concept is accurately measured in a 
quantitative study; in my study, that concept is airline safety. This research used a 
nonexperimental design, exploring correlation, not causation. Thus, threats to internal 
validity were not applicable (Ellis & Levy, 2009; Yilmaz, 2013; Zhou, Jin, Zhang, Li, & 
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Huang, 2016). However, threats to the validity of the statistical conclusions were of 
concern.  
Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Statistical conclusion validity is concerned with systematic and random errors and 
the appropriate use of data and statistical tests. Conclusion validity indicates whether 
there is a relationship between the independent and dependent variables that is not 
explainable by chance (Ellis & Levy, 2009; Cor, 2016; Yilmaz, 2013). Cor (2016) noted 
that the general questions of statistical conclusion validity relate to the appropriateness of 
the statistical tests chosen, and for the data and tests to meet the relevant statistical 
assumptions for the chosen tests.  
Threats to statistical conclusion validity can inflate Type I and Type II errors 
(Ellis & Levy, 2009).  Type I errors (alpha (α) errors) result in rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true (Gu, Hoijtinik, & Mulder, 2016; Kim, 2015), or falsely 
concluding that a relationship or difference exists between subject groups or variables 
when it does not (Trafimow & Earp, 2017). Low statistical power may lead to type I 
errors. Type II errors (beta (β) errors) result in failing to reject the null hypothesis when it 
is false (Gu et al., 2016; Kim, 2015), or falsely concluding that a relationship or 
difference does not exist between groups or variables when it does (Trafimow & Earp, 
2017).  
Minimizing type I and II errors requires balancing the alpha (statistical 
significance) and beta (statistical power) levels because as the probability of committing 
type I error increases, the probability of committing a type II error decreases (Kim, 2015; 
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Trafimow & Earp, 2017). To achieve a balance between type I and II errors, it is common 
to set the alpha (α) level, or level of statistical significance at 0.05 and the beta (β) level, 
or level of statistical power at 0.8 - 0.9 (Ioannidis, Hozo, & Djulbegovic, 2013; Kim, 
2015; Trafimow & Earp, 2017). Setting statistical significance at 0.05 and statistical 
power at 0.8 – 0.9 maximizes the chance of the researcher making correct inferences and 
minimizes the chances of making the wrong inferences (Ioannidis et al., 2013). Although, 
Chen, Chen, and Chen (2013) and Cho and Kim (2015) commented that in some studies 
it may be desirable to minimise either type I or type II errors at the expense of the other, 
depending on of the nature of the research question and the implications of accepting or 
rejecting the null hypothesis.  
The three conditions that can threaten the validity of the statistical conclusions 
are: (a) reliability of the instrument, (b) data assumptions, and (c) sample size (Karpinski, 
Kirschner, Ozer, Mellot, & Ochwo, 2013; Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). Rutkowski 
and Delandshere (2016) suggested that using a large enough sample size, a proven 
research instrument, and appropriate statistical tests with data that meets the required data 
assumptions, will minimize threats to statistical conclusion validity. 
While I did not use a published instrument, I did use accident categorization and 
data based on that published by the IATA and the ICAO. Accident data is the most 
common metric in aviation safety studies (e.g., Boyd, 2016; Chen & Li, 2016; Cui & Li, 
2015; Di Gravio et al., 2015; Knecht, 2013; Oster et al., 2013; Zavila et al., 2016), and 
transport safety studies in general (e.g., Eleftheria et al., 2016; Goh et al., 2014; Guest et 
al., 2014; Liu & Moini, 2015; Schepers et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2015). Face validity is 
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achieved when expert opinion agrees on whether an instrument measures the intended 
concept (Heale & Twycross, 2015). Aircraft accidents are the primary measure of airline 
safety by global bodies such as the ICAO (2017), the IATA (2017), and aircraft 
manufacturers such as Boeing (2017) and Airbus (2016), all of whom use the metric of 
accidents per million departures. Thus, the approach and data can be considered valid and 
reliable. 
The data assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, and normal distribution 
should be met. Regression analysis with data that violates the assumptions of linearity 
and normal distribution can result in biased results and confidence intervals (Crawford, 
2006; Uyanik & Guler, 2013). Green and Salkind (2017), Parra-Frutos (2013), and 
Uyanik and Guler (2013) all recommended that the data assumptions of 
homoscedasticity, linearity, and normal distribution can be verified by examining the 
normal probability plot of the standardized regression residuals, standardized residual 
scatter plots, and determining the skewness and kurtosis coefficients. Thus, I performed 
those three tests on my data to determine if the required data assumptions of 
homoscedasticity, linearity, and normal distribution were met. Finally, bootstrapping can 
be used within correlation and regression analysis to overcome issues of parameter 
dependency and produce robust test results (Barker & Shaw, 2015; Chang, Sickles, & 
Song, 2015; Green & Salkind, 2017). Thus, I used the bootstrapping feature of SPSS on 
my data. 
Regarding the threat to conclusion validity of an insufficient sample size, both Gu 
et al. (2016) and Sari et al. (2017) noted sample size could impact statistical significance 
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when sampling is limited. However, error probabilities for large sample sizes are usually 
not a problem, because as the sample size grows the probability of both type I and type II 
errors are reduced (Gu et al., 2016; Kim, 2015). The sample in my study was the total 
global population of all passenger airlines involved in accidents; thus, sample size should 
not impact statistical conclusion validity. An a priori calculation of sample size required 
to achieve an effect size of f = 0.10, α = 0.05, and power β = 0.90, required a minimum 
sample of 88, as shown in Figure 6. My sample size was 222. Further, the population 
used was the total population (N=890), removing any threats to sampling bias. 
External Validity 
Threats to external validity were also of concern. External validity reflects the 
extent to which the research results can be generalized to situations and populations 
beyond the sample population and the study itself (Cor, 2016; Yilmaz, 2013; Zhou et al., 
2016). External validity also addresses the ability to generalize the sample results across 
different measures, settings, or times (Cor, 2016; Ellis & Levy, 2009). The concept of 
longitudinal time validity is relevant to my study as I used 14 years of historical data to 
explore long-term relationships between the independent variables and safety 
performance.  
Threats to external validity include sampling bias, where many participants 
inadvertently share an important trait or many the population decline to participate 
(Zachariadis, Scott, & Barrett, 2013). The sample population of this research study is the 
total population, avoiding any threats of sampling bias. The second threat to external 
validity is temporal validity, or the impact of unique or temporary circumstances or time 
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on the variables, and the validity of the results over future time periods (Cor, 2016). To 
minimize temporal validity threats, I used 14 years of accident data from 2004 to 2017. A 
third threat is the interaction of unknown factors or influences on the variables 
(Zachariadis et al., 2013). Using the entire global population over a 14-year period 
minimizes the threat of unknown and uncontrollable factors and influences. Threats to 
ecological validity refer to the ability to generalize results from the controlled research 
environment to the real, authentic world (Cor, 2016). My research did not take place in a 
controlled environment but used the archival accident data of airlines from the real world. 
Transition and Summary 
Section 2 contained information on the purpose statement to assess the 
relationship between airline category, geographical region, and safety performance. In 
Section 2, I elaborated on the research method and design, explaining why I selected a 
quantitative method to examine the relationship between the variables. The role of the 
researcher and the research ethics of this study were discussed. I justified the use of a 
non-probability, total population sampling technique, and explained the data collection 
techniques, analysis methods, reliability, and validity. I obtained the archival data from 
the IATA, the ICAO, and OAG for data analysis. 
In Section 3, I analyze the data and interpret the results to present the study 
findings. My results and findings are applied to the professional practices of the airline 
industry, and implications for positive social change are considered. Finally, I discuss 




Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
Poor safety performance in the airline industry impacts airline economic 
performance, as airline accidents can result in direct costs of over US$500 million per 
accident (Walker et al., 2014). The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to 
examine the relationship between airline category, geographical region, and safety 
performance. The implications for positive social change include the potential for airline 
leaders to improve the safety image of their airline and provide passengers a better 
understanding of airline safety. Providing passengers with information on airline safety 
performance is beneficial for nervous flyers (Graham & Metz, 2017) and may allow 
passengers to make more informed choices on using different categories of airlines in 
different geographical regions. 
A correlational design was appropriate for the study because my goal was to 
understand relationships between the variables. ANOVA and t tests were appropriate for 
determining differences between the variables.  
Airline category (LCC or FSC) had no statistically significant difference in safety 
performance (accident rate per million departures) at a global level. When regional 
differences in LCC and FSC safety performance were examined, LCCs were significantly 
safer than FSCs in Africa and North America. Geographical region (eight regions) had a 
statistically significant difference in safety performance (accident rate per million 
departures), but only between the best performing region (North America) and the worst 
performing region (Africa). The regression model was not able to predict safety 
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performance significantly. The null hypothesis was accepted, and the alternative 
hypothesis was rejected. 
Presentation of the Findings  
In this section, I discuss the testing of the assumptions, present descriptive 
statistics, present inferential statistic results, provide a theoretical conversation related to 
the findings, and conclude with a concise summary. I employed bootstrapping, using 
1,000 samples, to address the possible influence of assumption violations. Thus, 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are presented where appropriate. 
The research question and purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to 
examine the difference and relationship between airline category, geographical region, 
and safety performance. I hypothesized that there is no statistically significant difference 
or relationship between airline category, geographical region, and safety performance. 
The independent variables were the category of an airline classified as LCC or FSC and 
the geographic region in which the airline was based. The dependent variable was the 
safety performance measured by aircraft accidents, normalized per million departures. 
Data for all variables consisted of archival data from the IATA, ICAO, and OAG, and 
aircraft accidents were normalized to a rate per million departures. The target population 
comprised all passenger airlines globally that had an accident (as defined by IATA) in the 
14-year period from 2004 to 2017. 
Due to the ratio level data of accident rate (per million departures) and the 
nominal data of airline category (LCC or FSC) and geographical region (eight separate 
regions), t tests and ANOVAs were used to determine if any significant differences 
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existed between the mean safety performance scores of the variables. Multiple linear 
regression analysis was used to determine the nature of the relationship between the 
variables of airline category. I utilized bootstrapping, using 1,000 samples to address the 
possible influence of assumption violations.  
Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions 
Parametric tests such as t tests, ANOVAs, and correlations with data that violates 
the assumptions of independent observations, normal distribution, and homogeneity of 
variance can result in biased results and confidence intervals (Ahad & Yahaya, 2014; 
Rana, Singhal, & Dua, 2016; Singh, Roy, & Tripathi, 2013). All observations were 
independent of each other. An airline can only be allocated to one category (LCC or FSC) 
and one region. The skewness score for the dataset was γ = 4.05 (γ = 4.10 for LCC and γ 
= 2.54 for FSC), and both the Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were 
significant, p < 0.001. A visual inspection of the normal probability plot (Q-Q plot) 
(Figure 7) also indicates a nonnormal distribution. Thus, the dataset was nonnormal and 
positively skewed. It is good that the data was positively skewed to zero accident rate as 
this highlights that aviation is a safe form of transport. Levene's test for homogeneity of 
variance showed that the variance of accident rates in regions was not equal, F(7, 214) = 






Figure 7. Normal probability plot (Q-Q) of the dependent variable (accident rate). 
Ensuring equal sample size (or balanced cells) assists to mitigate any violations of 
homogeneity of variance and nonnormality (Ahad & Yahaya, 2014; Osborne, 2013; 
Parra-Frutos, 2014; Skidmore & Thompson, 2013). My independent variables of airline 
categories (LCC and FSC) and the eight regions all had equal cell sizes. Large sample 
sizes assist to mitigate violations of normality (Marcinko, 2014; Williams, Grajales, & 
Kurkiewicz, 2013), although there is no agreed upon definition of a large sample size, 
and large sample size has been nominated as greater than 20 samples (Rana et al., 2016), 
25 samples (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008), 30 samples (Seco, Garcia, Garcia, & 
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Rojas, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2016), 48 samples (Skidmore & Thompson, 2013), 80 
samples (Sainani, 2012), and 100 samples (Lumley, Diehr, Emerson, & Chen, 2002). 
Saki and Tabesh (2014) recommended an increase in sample size by up to 30% of that 
required for a sample that meets all assumptions (note: G*Power calculations required for 
my conditions required a sample size of 88). Thus, my dataset of N = 222 (with 890 
airline accidents underpinning the accident rate calculations) can be considered 
sufficiently large, exceeding all the requirements. 
Bootstrapping can be used to overcome issues of parameter dependency and 
produce robust test results (Chang et al., 2015; Seco et al., 2013; Green & Salkind, 2017; 
Williams et al., 2013). Thus, I used bootstrapping with 1,000 samples, as recommended 
by Parra-Frutos, (2014) and Seco et al. (2013), to address the possible influence of 
assumption violations, and 95% confidence intervals based upon the bootstrap samples 
are reported where appropriate. In summary, the large size of my dataset, equal sample 
size, and use of bootstrapping are sufficient to mitigate the violations of normality and 
homogeneity of variance; which ensured the t test, ANOVA, and regression were 
appropriate and relatively robust to the assumption violations (Parra-Frutos, 2014; 
Sainani, 2012; Seco et al., 2013). 
Descriptive Statistics 
The original IATA dataset of all airline accidents from 2004 to 2017 consisted of 
1181 accidents. I removed all the cargo flights and ferry flights, as these are not 
passenger airline operations, leaving 890 accidents included in the analysis. The 
frequencies and percentages of the nominal level independent variables of airline 
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category and region are in Table 6. The means and standard deviation of the ratio level 
dependent variable (accident rate) are in Table 7. Table 8 displays the mean accident rate 
for LCCs and FSCs across all eight global regions. The regions of Africa and North 





Frequency and Percentage of Accidents for Airline Category and Region 
 Airline accidents (Total) 
Variable N % 
Airline category   
LCC 108 12.1 
FSC 782 87.9 
Global region   
Africa 100 11.2 
Asia Pacific 183 20.6 
Eastern Europe/CIS 78 8.8 
Latin America 113 12.7 
MENA 80 9.0 
North America 154 17.3 
North Asia 35 3.9 
Western Europe 146 16.4 





Mean and Standard Deviation of Accident Rates for Airline Category and Regions 
 Accident rate (per million departures) 
Variable M SD Bootstrapped 95% CI 
(M) 
Airline category    
LCC 3.26 7.74 [1.96, 4.88] 
FSC 4.15 4.53 [3.34, 5.06] 
Global region    
Africa 6.17 8.19 [3.35, 9.23] 
Asia Pacific 4.81 3.99 [3.45, 6.53] 
Eastern Europe/CIS 4.37 5.40 [2.51, 6.70] 
Latin America 2.87 3.66 [1.71, 4.30] 
MENA 4.98 5.92 [2.98, 7.28] 
North America 0.76 0.63 [0.52, 1.00] 
North Asia 4.27 12.27 [0.48, 9.41] 
Western Europe 1.61 0.89 [1.28, 1.91] 




Table 7  
Accident rate of Airline Category across Regions 
 Accident rate (per million departures) 
Region LCC FSC 
 M SD M SD 
Africa* 0.00 0.00 11.46 7.53 
Asia Pacific 5.99 5.36 3.62 1.18 
Eastern Europe/CIS 3.05 6.81 5.69 3.24 
Latin America 2.49 4.97 3.26 1.69 
MENA 4.18 4.18 5.78 5.78 
North America* 0.34 0.54 1.18 0.40 
North Asia 7.95  16.83 0.58 0.41 
Western Europe 1.58 1.04 1.64 0.75 





Frequency and Percentage of Aircraft Characteristics in Accidents by Airline Category 
 Airline accidents 
 LCC FSC 
 N % N % 
Total 108 12.1 782 87.9 
Aircraft origin     
Western built 107 0.9 687 12.1 
Eastern built 1 99.1 95 87.9 
Aircraft type     
Jet 82 75.9 467 59.7 
Turboprop 26 24.1 315 40.3 
Note. N = 890. 
Inferential Statistical Analysis 
My quantitative research question was:  
RQ: What is the relationship between airline category, geographical region, and 
safety performance?  
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between airline category, 
geographical region, and safety performance.  
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between airline category, 
geographical region, and safety performance.  
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A Pearson product-moment correlation was run to determine the relationship 
between the number of airline accidents and the number of airline departures. There was 
a moderate positive correlation between accidents and departures, which was statistically 
significant (r = 0.553, N = 222, p < 0.001). The greater the number of departures, the 
greater the number of accidents. 
I conducted an independent-samples t test (two-tailed), a = 0.05, to assess whether 
LCCs differed significantly from FSCs in a measure of safety performance. The 
assumptions of equal variances (Levene’s test, p = 0.061) were evaluated with no 
violations noted. The results were not significant, t(220) = -1.05, p = 0.329 (two-tailed). 
There were no significant differences in accident rates per million departures between 
LCCs (M = 3.26, SD = 7.74) and FSCs (M = 4.15, SD = 4.53) at a global level. The 95% 
CI of the mean difference (-0.89) was -2.57 to 0.78. Table 6 depicts the descriptive 
statistics of the variables. The safety performance of LCCs was significantly better than 
FSCs in Africa t(13) = -5.70, p < 0.001 (two-tailed) and North America t(26) = -4.46, p < 
0.001 (two-tailed). 
To explore any differences between the safety performance of the eight regions, I 
used a one-way ANOVA analysis to compare the means of regional accident rates per 
million departures. I conducted a one-way ANOVA, a = 0.05, to assess whether there 
was a statistically significant difference in safety performance (accident rate per million 
departures) for the eight regions. The results were significant, F(7, 214) = 2.40, p < 0.05. 
The measure of effect size measured by η2 was .07 indicating that 7% of the variance in 
the accident rate is accounted for by region. Post hoc analysis, using the Tukey HSD test, 
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indicated that the accident rate (per million departures) for Africa (M = 6.17, SD = 8.19) 
was significantly different (p = 0.03) from North America (M = 0.76, SD = 0.63). No 
other regions differed significantly from each other. Table 9 depicts the ANOVA 
summary. 
I conducted a two-way ANOVA that examined the effect of airline category and 
global region on the accident rate. There was a statistically significant interaction 
between the effects of airline category and region on accident rate, F(7, 206) = 5.59, p < 
0.001. Simple main effects analysis showed North America was safer than Africa (p < 
0.02), but there were no differences between any other regions. 
Table 9 
ANOVA Summary Table for the Impact of Region on Accident Rate 
Source df SS MS F η2 p 
Between-group 7 643.92 91.99 2.40 0.07 0.02 
Within-group 214 8210.59 38.37    
Total 221 8854.51     
 
I used standard multiple linear regression, α = 0.05 (two-tailed), to examine the 
efficacy of airline category in predicting safety performance. The independent variable 
was airline category (LCC or FSC), and the dependent variable was safety performance 
(accident rate). The null hypothesis was that airline category is not significantly related to 
safety performance. The alternative hypothesis was that airline category is significantly 
related to safety performance. The regression model was not able to significantly predict 
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airline safety performance F(1,220) = 1.10, p > 0.05, R2 = 0.005. The R2 (0.005) value 
indicated that less than 1% of the variation in safety performance is accounted for by the 
linear combination of airline category. In the final model, airline category did not explain 
any significant variation in safety performance. Table 10 depicts the regression analysis 
summary.  
Table 10 
Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables  
Variable Β SE Β β t p 
B   
95% Bootstrap CI 
Airline category 0.90 0.87 0.07 1.75 0.32 [-0.94, 2.43] 
Note. N = 222. 
Analysis summary. The purpose of this study was to examine the difference and 
relationship between airline category (LCC and FSC), global region (eight regions), and 
safety performance (accident rate). I used standard multiple linear regression to examine 
the ability of airline category to predict safety performance (accident rates). The model 
was unable to significantly predict airline accident rates F(1,220) = 1.10, p > 0.05, R2 = 
0.005. The conclusion from this analysis is that airline category (LCC or FSC) is not 
related to safety performance. 
To explore any differences between the safety performance of LCCs and FSCs, I 
used independent samples t-test analysis to compare the means of LCC and FSC accident 
rates per million departures. There were no significant differences in accident rates per 
million departures between LCCs and FSCs, t(220) = -1.05, p = 0.329 (2-tailed). To 
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explore any differences between the safety performance of the eight regions, I used a 
one-way ANOVA analysis to compare the means of regional accident rates per million 
departures. The results were significant, F(7, 214) = 2.40, p < 0.05. The accident rate for 
Africa (M = 6.17, SD = 8.19) was significantly larger (p = 0.03) than North America (M = 
0.76, SD = 0.63). No other regions significantly differed from each other.  
Both t-test and regression analysis found no relationship with or difference 
between airline category (LCC/FSC) and safety performance on a global level. LCCs 
were statistically safer than FSCs in Africa and North America. A statistically significant 
difference in safety performance was found between global regions, but only between the 
Africa and North America regions. The finding of no significant difference between the 
safety performance of LCCs and FSCs is supported by the Swiss cheese model of 
organizational accidents. Accidents in complex sociotechnical systems such as airlines 
are impacted by multiple latent and organizational factors; regulations and regulators, 
cultural attributes, and socio-economic conditions. These latent, organizational conditions 
are relatively constant across airlines within the same country or region. The safety 
standards that any airline must meet in a given country or region are the same for both 
low-cost and full-service airlines.  
While latent issues are relatively constant within a country or region, they are 
different between regions, with the greatest differences between the most and least 
developed regions. The results of such latent, organizational differences are different 
levels of safety performance, with the biggest safety differences between regions with the 
largest latent, organization differences (national culture, socioeconomic conditions, 
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regulatory effectiveness) such as comparing Africa to North America. The airline 
category of low-cost or full-service is not an organizational factor that impacts airline 
accidents globally, but the geographical region does impact airline accidents. 
Airline operations in different countries and regions have different levels of safety 
performance (Hodgson et al., 2013; IATA, 2017; ICAO, 2017; Oster et al., 2013; Savage, 
2012), and my research findings supported those differences. However, the finding that 
airline category was not related to safety performance at a global level contradicts 
traveler perceptions that the aggressive operational cost cutting of LCCs impacts safety. 
While LCCs offer a reduced level of service, they do not offer a reduced level of safety. 
On the contrary, in the regions of Africa and North America, LCCs had superior safety 
performance to FSCs. 
Table 11 
Accident & Incident Rate of US carriers (Flores & Reyes, 2006) 
 Accident rate (per 
million sectors) 
Incident rate (per million 
sectors) 
US mainline (FSC) 5.0  31.3 
US LCC  2.4  13.9 
US Regional  3.9  22.9 
Note: Accident and incident defined as per FAA. Excludes 9/11 events. 
My results of LLC and FSC safety performance in North America are similar to 
those of Flores and Reyes (2006) who have conducted one of the few studies comparing 
LCC and FSC safety. Flores and Reyes (2006) compared the accident and incident rate of 
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U.S. mainline carriers (FSCs), LCCs, and regional carriers over a five-year period (2000-
2004).  The results (shown in Table 11) indicate that U.S. LCCs had better safety 
performance than their mainline (FSC) and regional counterparts, with the accident and 
incident rate for LCCs less than half that of mainline (FSC) carriers. Flores & Reyes 
(2006) concluded that strategic choices and organizational cultures were key to safety 
performance, citing the LCCs’ choice of single-type fleets of third-generation jets, and 
simpler organizational structures. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
Passengers rank airline safety as one of the most important factors in airline 
choice selection (Desai et al., 2014; Jeeradista et al., 2016; Jiang, 2013; Min & Min, 
2015). Thus, safety performance impacts an airline’s ability to attract and maintain 
customers (Sandada & Matibiri, 2016). The research may be of value to leaders in the 
LCC airline sector as the findings suggest there is no statistically significant difference 
between LCC and FSC safety performance at a global level. In most regions, the LCC 
accident rate is lower than the FSC accident rate, but it is only statistically significant in 
Africa and North America, where LCCs have a lower accident rate. Thus, it can be 
suggested that LCCs have the same, if not lower accident rates than FSCs, and LCCs are 
at least as safe as FSCs. LCCs can use this information to counter negative media reports, 
industrial arguments, and traveler perception on the LCC sector’s safety performance. 
It is well-accepted that developing regions have worse safety performance than 
developed regions, hence the focus of bodies like the IATA and ICAO to improve safety 
in developing regions. Thus, the finding that airlines in North America have statistically 
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significant lower accident rates than airlines in Africa is not surprising. It may be more 
surprising that the differences between regional safety performance were not more 
common. The results do confirm that airlines in developing regions, regardless of airline 
category, need to be conscious of their safety performance and take steps to improve it. 
An improvement in the safety performance of airlines in developing regions may attract 
new customers. 
One possible reason for the equal or better safety performance of LCCs to FSCs is 
that FSCs operate more eastern-built aircraft and more turboprop aircraft. Both eastern-
built aircraft and more turboprop aircraft are over-represented in accident rates. There are 
positive safety implications and hence, positive business implications for the LCC sector 
in operating a fleet of a predominantly western-built jet aircraft. LCC managers may 
consider sharing this fleet information more widely, using it to their advantage. Avoiding 
or minimizing the exposure to eastern-built aircraft and turboprop aircraft should be a 
consideration in future fleet decisions for both LCC and FSC.  
Passengers are often willing to pay more to fly with airlines they perceive as safe 
(Molin et al., 2017), and passengers are more loyal to safe airlines, avoiding unsafe 
airlines, particularly in regions with historically poor airlines safety performance 
(Sandada & Matibiri, 2016). Passengers have previously chosen to fly FSCs over LCCs 
due to the better safety image of FSCs (Lu, 2017). However, the findings of this current 
study can be used by LCC airline management to positively change the safety image of 
the LCC sector. Information related to airline safety performance might be used by airline 
managers to shape airline image and influence passenger airline choice, which may 
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impact business performance. Fleischer et al. (2015) noted that when objective safety 
information is available, passengers will discount their subjective opinions and 
perceptions and incorporate that objective information into their decision making on 
airline choice, and that includes paying a premium to travel on airlines with high safety 
performance. In summary, there is a potential business benefit through increased 
knowledge of airline safety performance. 
Implications for Social Change 
There is no significant difference in the safety performance of LCCs and FSCs, 
but there is a significant difference between regional safety performance. The category of 
the airline (LCC or FSC) had no relationship with airline accident rates, whereas the 
regional origin of the airline did. Safety is one of the most important considerations in 
airline choice, and these findings provide passengers a better understanding of airline 
safety performance, presenting greater opportunities for passengers to make informed 
choices about airline selection. Information that can reduce the safety concerns of 
travelers, particularly nervous flyers or those with flight phobias is of benefit to those 
travelers (Graham & Metz, 2017). Travelers with a fear of flying more strongly avoid 
airlines perceived as having poor safety performance. Up to 30% of the adult population 
has a fear of flying (Fleischer et al., 2015) and providing airline safety information to that 
population allows a more rationale airline choice. Removing barriers to air travel, 
especially those around safety, may result in new travel opportunities for travelers that 
were previously unrealized due to their safety concerns. Travelers are now able to alter 
their perceptions of LCC and FSC safety performance, as there is no global difference in 
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accident rates, and indeed, LCCs had lower accident rates in Africa and North America. 
LCCs should be viewed to be as safe, if not safer, than FSCs. Travelers may now also 
make more informed decisions about the safety performance of airlines from different 
regions. For example, if flying between North America and Africa, it is statistically safer 
to travel on the North American based airlines rather than the African based airlines. 
Recommendations for Action 
The first recommendation is for airlines to reduce their exposure to eastern-built 
aircraft and turboprop aircraft due to the higher accident rates of such aircraft types. 
There are often sound economic and operational reasons for operating turboprops on 
certain routes, which needs to be balanced against safety risks. 
The second recommendation is for the LCC management to more proactively 
promote the safety performance of the LCC sector. LCC managers need to counter the 
misperceptions about LL safety performance and inform travelers and the broader public 
of the safety performance of LCCs. Industry bodies such as the IATA and associated 
regional airline bodies should promote this safety knowledge to expand and grow the 
airline industry as a whole. IATA can release safety information about LCC safety 
performance through its website, press releases, and its annual safety report. 
Finally, it is recommended that the ICAO provides greater assistance to regulators 
in developing regions, particularly Africa. ICAO’s assistance could include resources and 
training to develop and mature the airline regulatory systems in developing regions. The 
theory of organizational accidents in complex sociotechnical systems reinforces the need 
for effective regulatory systems to improve aviation safety. 
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I aim to present this work at the Flight Safety Foundation International Airline 
Safety Summit (IASS), as it is considered by airline safety professionals to be the premier 
safety conference. I will submit the research for publication in a journal such as Safety 
Science, Journal of Airline Management, or Accident Analysis and Prevention, as these 
were the three most commonly cited journals in my literature review. However, 
passengers and the travelling public do not read academic safety journals or attend airline 
professional conferences, so it is most important to consider how to ensure my research 
findings reach a broader public audience, who can benefit from the social change. Thus, I 
will use social media and connections to spread a broader message of my findings.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
A lack of flight sector data for all airlines individually in the accident database 
does not permit the calculation of accident rates for individual airlines. Future researchers 
might explore specific airline accident rates by examining airline’s annual reports and 
other reliable sources of flight frequency data. The accident data set is limited to the 14-
year period 2003 to 2017. Thus, future researchers could update the dataset. With the 
global growth of LCCs, continuing research is relevant. Safety performance was 
measured by accidents which are retrospective and limited in number. No globally 
consistent, proactive safety metric was available at the time I conducted this study. In the 
future, such a measure may be applied to all airlines in all regions, thus allowing global 
safety performance to be examined consistently by metrics other than accidents. 
I examined the relationship and differences between LCCs and FSCs safety 
performance in different global regions. I provided suggestions why there was not a 
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difference or relationship between LCC and FSC safety performance and suggestions 
why there was a difference in safety performance between some regions but did not 
empirically examine the research question of why or how. Thus, future researchers may 
examine why there is or is not a relationship or difference between the variables 
Reflections 
As someone with a deep interest in aviation, I entered this DBA doctoral research 
with the assumption that LCCs should be as safe as FSCs in any given region, a view I 
was criticized for by many of my aviation colleagues.  I remained conscious of my bias to 
ensure neutrality and conducted multiple statistical tests to explore and confirm 
relationships and differences between the variables in different ways. Given the ongoing 
discussion in the aviation industry about the poor safety performance of the developing 
regions, I did expect to find significant safety differences between more regions. My 
findings have reinforced to me the power of data over opinion, and to keep an open mind 
and not be swayed by influential voices or popular opinion. Finally, I was concerned 
about using the Swiss cheese model of organizational safety as it has not been updated 
for over 20 years and has come under recent criticism. Despite this, Reason’s Swiss 
cheese model and the theory of organizational accidents in complex sociotchnical 
systems was still able to correlate with my findings. Old does not always mean outdated. 
Conclusion 
Although travelers perceive FSCs to be safer than LCCs, this research study 
found that LCCs are as safe, if not safer than FSCs based on accident rates. Based on the 
theory of organizational accidents, LCCs and FSCs have similar levels of safety 
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performance within any country or region they operate within the same organizational 
system, within the same cultural, socioeconomic, and regulatory environments. However, 
those same systems and environments differ between countries and region. There are 
regional differences in airline safety, with North America being the safest region and 
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Appendix A: Safety Performance by Airline Category and Geographical Region 
Table A12 
Safety Performance: World 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 24,521,979 2,294,184 61 6 2.49 2.62 
2005 25,074,538 2,680,231 82 7 3.27 2.61 
2006 25,044,538 3,207,405 47 8 1.88 2.49 
2007 25,610,598 3,915,356 61 9 2.38 2.30 
2008 25,270,855 4,383,125 62 8 2.45 1.83 
2009 24,095,806 4,481,244 55 11 2.28 2.45 
2010 24,951,163 5,007,486 64 5 2.57 1.00 
2011 25,377,501 5,578,045 74 5 2.92 0.90 
2012 25,267,687 5,989,334 54 4 2.14 0.67 
2013 25,231,689 6,440,899 56 7 2.22 1.09 
2014 25,419,695 6,942,039 44 10 1.73 1.44 
2015 25,772,545 7,640,241 49 7 1.90 0.92 
2016 26,543,805 8,348,397 37 12 1.39 1.44 




Safety Performance: Western Europe 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 5,375,502 557,746 13 2 2.42 3.59 
2005 5,452,401 702,896 11 1 2.02 1.42 
2006 5,490,683 833,913 7 1 1.27 1.20 
2007 5,598,905 1,065,989 15 2 2.68 1.88 
2008 5,504,913 1,212,523 6 3 1.09 2.47 
2009 5,071,798 1,239,477 10 4 1.97 3.23 
2010 5,158,182 1,342,764 4 1 0.78 0.74 
2011 5,146,594 1,441,358 8 2 1.55 1.39 
2012 4,926,516 1,515,758 10 3 2.03 1.98 
2013 4,762,056 1,581,407 12 0 2.52 .00 
2014 4,697,163 1,762,880 4 2 0.85 1.13 
2015 4,706,631 1,948,592 11 0 2.34 .00 
2016 4,837,584 2,147,944 6 3 1.24 1.40 





Safety Performance: Eastern Europe and CIS 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 676,385 18,328 4 0 5.91 .00 
2005 730,265 39,890 5 0 6.85 .00 
2006 799,796 57,040 7 0 8.75 .00 
2007 864,876 76,170 3 0 3.47 .00 
2008 962,877 89,045 8 1 8.31 11.23 
2009 893,973 86,094 2 2 2.24 23.23 
2010 953,769 91,815 7 0 7.34 .00 
2011 1,036,934 91,722 14 0 13.50 .00 
2012 1,027,334 106,682 4 0 3.89 .00 
2013 1,038,685 122,230 8 1 7.70 8.18 
2014 1,078,810 140,299 3 0 2.78 .00 
2015 1,067,343 178,352 3 0 2.81 .00 
2016 1,091,329 211,608 3 0 2.75 .00 





Safety Performance: North America 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 10,120,329 1,476,666 8 0 0.79 .00 
2005 10,159,268 1,581,845 19 3 1.87 1.90 
2006 9,606,789 1,764,759 6 0 0.62 .00 
2007 9,700,893 1,950,046 14 1 1.44 0.51 
2008 9,221,909 2,028,577 10 0 1.08 .00 
2009 8,546,586 1,927,913 9 0 1.05 .00 
2010 8,447,920 1,994,028 13 0 1.54 .00 
2011 8,326,224 2,100,826 16 0 1.92 .00 
2012 8,173,862 2,049,095 9 0 1.10 .00 
2013 8,11,0711 2,002,903 10 1 1.23 0.50 
2014 7,955,135 2,011,167 8 1 1.01 0.50 
2015 7,816,557 2,111,644 10 1 1.28 0.47 
2016 7,802,160 2,236,085 6 2 0.77 0.89 





Safety Performance: Latin America 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 2,267,573 118,252 4 2 1.76 16.91 
2005 2,276,328 138,993 13 0 5.71 .00 
2006 2,288,348 195,862 7 2 3.06 10.21 
2007 2,298,096 263,295 8 0 3.48 .00 
2008 2,280,286 328,154 15 0 6.58 .00 
2009 2,140,504 407,013 8 0 3.74 .00 
2010 2,349,156 511,100 9 1 3.83 1.96 
2011 2,363,559 631,466 13 2 5.50 3.17 
2012 2,426,825 684,895 3 1 1.24 1.46 
2013 2,263,799 854,250 6 0 2.65 .00 
2014 2,333,849 897,077 7 0 3.00 .00 
2015 2,365,994 935,770 3 0 1.27 .00 
2016 2,381,857 904,354 6 2 2.52 .00 





Safety Performance: North Asia 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 2,524,638 12,822 4 0 1.58 .00 
2005 2,716,227 17,953 1 1 0.37 55.70 
2006 2,972,400 29,644 2 1 0.67 33.73 
2007 3,181,037 55,906 2 1 0.63 17.89 
2008 3,279,096 62,617 1 0 0.30 .00 
2009 3,412,733 110,487 1 0 0.29 .00 
2010 3,699,978 163,150 2 0 0.54 .00 
2011 3,922,009 211,394 2 0 0.51 .00 
2012 4,188,010 264,959 5 0 1.19 .00 
2013 4,496,400 317,208 3 0 0.67 .00 
2014 4,711,155 394,071 2 1 0.42 2.54 
2015 4,898,475 534,325 4 0 0.82 .00 
2016 5,167,571 687,045 1 1 0.19 1.46 





Safety Performance: Asia Pacific 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 2,407,634 105,967 11 2 4.57 18.87 
2005 2,502,115 189,192 12 2 4.80 10.57 
2006 2,586,543 308,518 8 4 3.09 12.97 
2007 2,570,385 467,866 13 5 5.06 10.69 
2008 2,544,260 602,132 12 3 4.72 4.98 
2009 2,467,341 626,231 9 4 3.65 6.39 
2010 2,646,129 772,033 7 3 2.65 3.89 
2011 2,801,241 940,894 10 1 3.57 1.06 
2012 2,709,185 1,192,164 12 0 4.43 .00 
2013 2,744,073 1,371,254 9 4 3.28 2.92 
2014 2,747,525 1,521,263 11 6 4.00 3.94 
2015 2,945,960 1,655,682 12 5 4.07 3.02 
2016 3,162,188 1,851,534 5 4 1.58 2.16 





Safety Performance: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 631,970 4,403 5 0 7.91 .00 
2005 674,543 9,462 7 0 10.38 .00 
2006 748,107 16,018 6 0 8.02 .00 
2007 820,349 22,545 6 0 7.31 .00 
2008 874,189 38,802 5 1 5.72 25.77 
2009 967,433 56,531 9 1 9.30 17.69 
2010 1,055,075 101,313 8 0 7.58 .00 
2011 1,088,991 112,752 8 0 7.35 .00 
2012 1,099,928 132,030 3 0 2.73 .00 
2013 1,112,066 159,046 4 1 3.60 6.29 
2014 1,181,613 177,655 3 0 2.54 .00 
2015 1,21,4325 215,749 2 1 1.65 4.64 
2016 1,308,310 240,684 8 1 6.11 4.15 





Safety Performance: Africa 
Year Departures Accidents Accident rate (per 
million departures) 
 FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC 
2004 517,948 0 12 NA 23.17 NA 
2005 563,391 0 14 NA 24.85 NA 
2006 551,872 1,651 4 0 7.25 .00 
2007 576,057 13,539 11 0 19.10 .00 
2008 603,325 21,275 5 0 8.29 .00 
2009 595,438 27,498 7 0 11.76 .00 
2010 640,954 31,283 14 0 21.84 .00 
2011 691,949 47,633 3 0 4.34 .00 
2012 716,027 43,751 8 0 11.17 .00 
2013 703,899 32,601 4 0 5.68 .00 
2014 714,445 37,627 6 0 8.40 .00 
2015 757,260 60,127 4 0 5.28 .00 
2016 792,806 69,143 3 0 3.78 .00 




Appendix B: Global Regions (per OAG definitions) 
 
Region Countries 
Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Congo DRC, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius,, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tome & Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Asia Pacific Afghanistan, American Samoa, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Christmas Island, Cocos & 
Keeling Islands, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia. Guam, 
India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, 
New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, 
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam 
Eastern Europe & Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
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CIS Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan 
Latin America Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bonaire and Saba, Brazil, 
Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland 
Islands, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, 
Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, , 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
MENA Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen 
North East Asia Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Mongolia, North Korea, South 
Korea, Taiwan 
North America Canada, Greenland, Unite States of America 
Western Europe Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, 
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
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Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
 
